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INTRODUCTION
Dissenting in the University of Michigan Law School affirmative
action case, Grutter v. Bollinger,1 Chief Justice Rehnquist twice
described the approach of the majority as "unprecedented,"2 while
Justice Kennedy declared it "antithetical to strict scrutiny."3 Justice
Thomas followed suit, also labeling the Court's analysis "antitheti-
cal to strict scrutiny" and twice calling it "unprecedented."4 But the
idea judged as dangerous and different-the idea of affording
school administrators a degree of "deference" in judging their race-
conscious activity?-is surprisingly as old as Brown v. Board of
Education 11.6
The 1955 Brown H case is well-known for requiring schools to
desegregate only "with all deliberate speed," rather than immedi-
ately.7 Most examining Brown H and its aftermath have debated
the utility and justification for the judiciary's allowance of remedial
1. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
2. Id. at 2362, 2370 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, JJ.).
3. Id. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Deference [to defendants] is antithetical to
strict scrutiny, not consistent with it."); see also id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The
Court, however, does not apply strict scrutiny."); id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The
Court, in a review that is nothing short of perfunctory, accepts the University of Michigan
Law School's assurances that its admissions process meets with constitutional
requirements."); id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The majority today refuses to be faithful to
the settled principle of strict review designed to reflect these concerns [about racial
preferences]."); id. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("It is but further evidence of the
necessity for scrutiny that is real, not feigned, where the corrosive category of race is a factor
in decisionmaking."); id. at 2374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("It is regrettable [that] the Court's
important holding ... is accompanied by a suspension of... strict scrutiny .... ").
4. Id. at 2350, 2356 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Scalia, J.); see also id. at 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(describing the majority's approach as "reflexive deference"); id. at 2359 n.9 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using the term "incredible").
5. See id. at 2338-46; infra notes 45-71 and accompanying text (analyzing the majority's
approach to deference).
6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II]. Brown II is
discussed at length infra Part II.A. In Brown v. Board of Education I, the Court declared that
de jure segregation is unconstitutional. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
[hereinafter Brown I]. This liability decision was followed by Brown II, which addressed the
remedy.
7. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
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delay.8 Another important concept, however, emerges from Brown
II, one almost completely overshadowed by the debate over timing.
This is the idea of promoting "local control" in school desegregation,
and concerns the role afforded to the defendants, by the judiciary,
in ending de jure segregation. That aspect of Brown II makes
Grutter's analysis less novel than some members of the Court have
characterized it-and reveals that federalism and judicial compe-
tency partially justify Grutter's idea of deference.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes Grutter's
approach of deferring to education officials defending their affir-
mative action policies. In upholding the constitutionality of the
University of Michigan Law School's race-conscious admissions
program, the Court finally laid to rest, at least temporarily, the
idea that strict scrutiny is always fatal in fact.9 The question now
is whether Grutter's strict scrutiny is true strict scrutiny because
the majority was highly deferential to the defendants. That is, in
holding that diversity could be a compelling governmental interest,
the majority took the school officials at their word when the
school officials said they needed racial diversity for educational
reasons and, in holding that the program was narrowly tailored,
the majority gave the defendants the benefit of the doubt in the
operation of the racial preferences.'" As a result, educators can
classify students according to their race in admissions, and educa-
tors are given some degree of deference in making and implement-
ing that decision, albeit within critical limitations." The dissenting
8. For a summary of the debate regarding "with all deliberate speed," see Jack M.
Balkin, Brownv. Board of Education-A Critical Introduction, in WHAT BRoWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 2, 64-72 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
9. Justice O'Connor had written before that strict scrutiny was not always fatal in fact.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (O'Connor, J., writing for
the majority) (stating that "we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in
theory, but fatal in fact") (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring in judgment)); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995) [hereinafter
Jenkins III] (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reasoning that "it is not true that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact") (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment)). See generally Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, Foreword to The Supreme Court,
1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (coining the phrase "strict in theory and fatal in
fact").
10. See infra notes 45-71 and accompanying text.
11. Two colleges have attempted, unsuccessfully, to defend their admission practices by
20041 1693
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Justices labeled the majority's approach not only as novel, but
wrong. 12
Part II turns to school desegregation to consider whether the
role of deference in Grutter is new. The comparison of affirmative
action to school desegregation might strike some as odd. Most
scholars considering both have limited their discussion to whether
affirmative action is consistent or inconsistent with the Brown v.
Board of Education I prohibition of assigning students according
to their race (i.e., whether Brown I reflects an anticlassification or
antisubordination principle).13 There is more to be said, however,
because affirmative action and school desegregation cases are
fundamentally quite similar. Both are Equal Protection Clause
challenges to the racial activities of public schools that can result
in federal court participation in local and state educational policy.14
With these similarities in mind, Part II explores the concept of
"local control" in school desegregation as a potential precursor to
Grutter's use of deference.15 This history reveals that starting with
Brown II, the Supreme Court has hesitated in involving itself too
closely in school administration and has instead promoted the idea
reference to educational needs or academic policy. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411,
2417 (2003) (deeming the University of Michigan undergraduate admissions program an
unconstitutional quota); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,547-48,558 (1996) (holding
unconstitutional a state all-male military college).
12. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text; infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
13. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Because of Brown rs status, those
participating in the debate over the legality and utility of affirmative action would often
claim support from Brown I. See generally Balkin, supra note 8, at 55-56. Those supporting
affirmative action would define Brown I as establishing an antisubordination principle. See
id. That is, the inequality outlawed by Brown I is the subordination of one group for the
benefit of another or for the perpetuation of inequality. See id. at 56. Affirmative action
opponents, on the other hand, contend that Brown I had adopted an anticlassification
principle-that the Equal Protection Clause precludes any consideration of race, regardless
of the reason. See id. at 55.
14. Two structural differences exist, but neither affects this Article's thesis. See infra
notes 335-44 and accompanying text (discussing the primary differences between affirmative
action and school desegregation causes of action). First, defendants in these two types of
cases consider race for different reasons. School desegregation defendants undertake race-
conscious activity to redress the effects of their past unlawful discrimination, while
affirmative action defendants consider race typically to promote educational diversity. See,
e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003); Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 74, 76-77.
More significantly, remedial differences may exist. See infra notes 340-44 and accompanying
text (analyzing the potential remedial differences).
15. See infra Part II.A-D.
1694
CONNECTING THE DOTS
of state and local control over the desegregation process.16 To be
sure, the common perception of school desegregation is that of the
district court or magistrate judge moving into the school superin-
tendent's office.17 This perception, however, is based on both a brief
time in history and the influence of some unique, high profile
judges.18 The past and present reveal a federal judiciary that
generally, although not always, defers to public school officials to
define the nature of the right to be free from dejure segregation by
promoting the concept of local control over schools undergoing
desegregation.19
Part III compares the local control in school desegregation with
Grutter's deference in affirmative action and finds remarkable
similarities. Both reveal the judiciary's reluctance to involve itself
too closely in school operation.' As a result, both allow school
officials to regard race without a traditional strict scrutiny analysis,
and both promote local and state control over schools at the expense
of the power of the federal judiciary.21 Thus, Part III argues that it
is wrong to characterize the Grutter Court's approach to deference
as new.
22
In Part IV, this Article again turns to school desegregation, this
time as a vehicle to evaluate the dissents' normative arguments
that the Grutter Court erred in inteijecting deference into Equal
Protection jurisprudence. Part IV first argues that one of the
Court's favorite subjects of late-federalism-strongly justifies the
role of local control in school desegregation. Throughout its almost
fifty-year history, school desegregation appears to be part of
what Professor Richard H. Fallon has deemed the "quiet fronts"
23
16. See infra Part II.E.
17. Cf OWEN FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 28 (1978) (noting the importance of
individual judges in structural injunction cases).
18. See infra Part II.B; infra notes 220-35, 24143 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part II.E.
20. Competency is the idea that educators are better equipped to make educational policy
than any judge. See infra Part 1V.B.3. Federalism, on the other hand, dictates that some
matters are properly within the sole authority of state and local governments. See infra Part
IV.A.
21. See infra Part III.
22. The role of deference in Grutter should not be surprising for other reasons as well.
See infra note 78.
23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 'ConservativePath s of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
2004] 1695
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of federalism-areas in which the Supreme Court can, and in some
instances has, promoted federalism, but areas outside of those
areas typically associated with the Court's recent federalism
"revival."24 One rarely thinks of school desegregation as furthering
federalism because of its strong association with rejecting a state's
right to choose a school system that segregates.' Further, the
underlying right at issue in school desegregation, the right of
students to equal protection of the law, is, at its core, a prohibition
aimed at states. 6 Similarly, academic literature largely has treated
federalism and the Equal Protection Clause separately." Yet,
throughout the history of school desegregation, the Court has often
crafted rules allowing state and local choice and, as a consequence,
limiting national authority.' Federalism principles provide a strong
foundation for these school desegregation rules. Although it is far
too early to make a definitive assessment, affirmative action in
schools may also become another quiet front.' For reasons similar
to those supporting local control in school desegregation, federalism
Decisions, 69 U. Cin. L. REV. 429, 432 (2002).
24. Id. at 430; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213 (1998); see also Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott,
Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301,
1303 (2002) (describing a "federalism revolution').
25. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Southern response to
Brown I and 11).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
27. The connection between equal protection, federalism, and public schools has gone
almost completely unnoticed in the academic literature. One notable exception is Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The Case of
Deregulated Education, 50 DuKEL.J. 753 (2000). That article applies the values of federalism
to charter schools in arguing that a more pragmatic approach to Equal Protection challenges
should be applied to charter schools. See id. at 834-48. One discussion of the Supreme Court's
recent federalism decisions briefly noticed the connection with the Court's approach to school
desegregation remedies. See John J. Dinan, The Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions in
Perspective, 15 J.L. & POLY 127, 174-75 (1999) (including a brief analysis of the Supreme
Court's recent school desegregation opinions); see also DAvID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A
DIALOGUE 105 (1995) (arguing that Brown I can further federalism values).
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra notes 345-48 and accompanying text. Of course, federalism will not cover
private schools' defense of affirmative action programs, although competency will still apply.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
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supports a role of deference for education officials in affirmative
action litigation. 0
After connecting local control and deference to federalism,
Part IV next analyzes whether federalism should impact Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence. School desegregation's experience
reveals two reasons to limit federalism's impact. First, courts can
manipulate federalism to reach a desired outcome.3 Although
local control has counted throughout much of the history of school
desegregation, this has not been true at every step. 2 Local control
has, in some limited instances, been absent from school desegrega-
tion. This occurred not because of federalism itself, but because
federalism conflicted with other ideologies.3 That is, federalism was
short-changed so that a different substantive agenda could be
advanced. The same will likely be true for deference in affirmative
action; deference to educators will likely have less force when it
conflicts with other belief systems.3' That federalism principles will
sometimes yield to other policies also means that the idea of
deference, while important, is far from determinative.
30. That is, federalism principles should have at least limited applicability in both school
desegregation and federalism, despite differences between the two. See infra notes 33544
and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part IV.B.1.
32. See infra Part II.B; infra notes 220-35 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text. Some commentators have noted other
inconsistencies in the current federalism revival. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer,
The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 142
(asserting that "the anticommandeering doctrines cannot ... be otherwise justified on
federalism grounds"); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499,
503 (1995) (arguing that "the values of federalism seem almost completely unrelated to the
Supreme Court's federalism decisions"); Colker & Scott, supra note 24, at 1311 (concluding
after an analysis of voting practices of individual Justices when invalidating state laws or
action that we must "redefine federalism so as to include activism on behalf of a conservative
political agenda"); Fallon, supra note 23, at 434 ('[T]he substantive conservatism of the
Court's majority explains most, if not all, ofthe quiet fronts in the federalism revival.... When
federalism and substantive conservatism come into conflict, substantive conservatism
frequently dominates."). See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist
Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 24 (2001) (discussing
the "happy development" of the Court's revival in federalism jurisprudence); Lawrence
Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Or. REV. 125, 174-80
(advocating the Frankfurter constraint-under which the Court is pressured to avoid
seemingly politically based opinions-as an explanation for the Court's seemingly
inconsistent opinions).
34. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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A second and related lesson from school desegregation is the
possibility that the Equal Protection right will have profoundly
different meanings for different students. 5 By giving defendants
some control over the definition of the right at play, the federal
judiciary is affording students rights dependent on the school to
which they seek admittance. 6 This geographical component to
Equal Protection rights is contrary to the ideal of freedom from
race discrimination. Even more troubling is the possibility that the
different meanings will result in weak constitutional rights for
some students.
Yet, given the institutional limitations of the courts, as school
desegregation demonstrates far too well," some allowance of
state and local authority in Equal Protection Clause enforcement
is not only inevitable, but necessary. 9 The judiciary's competency
in educational matters is limited, and both affirmative action and
school desegregation include not only legal principles, but educa-
tional ones as well. In short, Grutter ultimately got it right when it
deferred to education officials defending their affirmative action
policies-but the idea of deference must be closely monitored.
I. GRUTTER AND DEFERENCE
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court held constitutional
the University of Michigan Law School's (law school) race-conscious
admission program by a 5-4 vote."° The law school justified its
preference for African American, Hispanic, and Native American
applicants on the need for "educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body." 1 Employing the rhetoric of strict scrutiny,
the Supreme Court held that diversity can be a compelling govern-
35. See infra Part IV.B.2.
36. See infra Part IV.B.2.
37. See infra Part IV.B.2.
38. For some of the more prominent competency critiques of school desegregation, see
DONALD L. HoRowrrz, THE CoURTS AND SOCIAL PoucY 17-19, ch. 4 (1977); MICHAEL A.
REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKINGANDTHE COURTS: AN EMPIRIcAL
STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ch. 8 (1982); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? pt. 1 (1991).
39. See infra Part IV.B.3.
40. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003).
41. Id. at 2338 (quoting Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. at i, Grutter (No. 02-241)).
1698 [Vol. 45:1691
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mental interest in the education setting, and that the law school's
program was narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of diversity."2
Justice O'Connor, author of the majority opinion, followed black
letter law by adopting the strict scrutiny standard. The defendants
admitted that the program treated students differently because
of their race,"3 and the Supreme Court has firmly established
thatstrictscrutiny governs such a situation, regardless of wheth-
er the treatment is defined as "benign" or "invidious."" Yet, the
Court's application of strict scrutiny surprised many because of the
Court's explicit adoption of deference to the defendants in evaluat-
ing the challenged program.'5
On the first part of the strict scrutiny test, whether diversity is
a compelling governmental interest, the majority began by taking
the defendants at their word on diversity's educational necessity, a
matter over which the Court typically claims no special authority.
42. Id. at 2338-41.
43. Id. at 2334.
44. Id. at 2337-38; see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225-26 (1995);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ., plurality opinion); id. at 520 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
Not all race-conscious activity has been deemed a racial classification subject to strict
scrutiny. For example, legislators may consider race in redistricting without surviving strict
scrutiny, so long as race is not the predominant consideration. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532
U.S. 234, 241 (2001) (stating that for legislative scheme to use racial considerations
improperly, "[race must not simply have been 'a motivation for the drawing of a majority-
minority district,'... but 'the predominant factor motivating the ... decision') (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and
Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1573 (2002)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's recent voting jurisprudence "suggest[s] a nuanced
understanding both of what triggers and of what satisfies strict scrutiny"). Similarly,
Professors Michelle Adams and Kathleen M. Sullivan have argued that the Constitution
allows governments to consider race at some level, such as the gathering of racial and ethnic
data on the census or other types of "soft" affirmative action, and not be subject to strict
scrutiny. See Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1395,
1396; Kathleen M. Sullivan,AfterAffirmativeAction, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1047 (1998); see
also Wendy Parker, The Color of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563,592-
99 (2001) (arguing that state legislation requiring charter schools to be racially balanced
should not be subject to strict scutiny). Thus, no one has yet challenged public schools for
gathering race and ethnicity data on their students or personnel or for celebrating February
as African American History Month.
45. Other aspects of Justice O'Connor's opinion were also unexpected by most. See Jack
Greenberg, Diversity, The University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610,1616
(2003) (arguing that Justice O'Connor's views on race in Grutter were "path-breaking").
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Thus, the Court reasoned that "Itihe Law School's educational
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission
is one to which we defer.""" But the Court also noted a role for
deference on the legal question of what is a compelling governmen-
tal interest: "Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of
giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions,
within constitutionally prescribed limits."
14 7
In response to the dissenters' complaints about the role of
deference, Justice O'Connor reasoned that "[olur scrutiny of the
interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into
account complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university."48 Yet, Justice
O'Connor's analysis is clearly one of deferring to the defendants on
a legal question.
The Court's analysis on whether diversity can be a compelling
governmental interest took four steps. First, the majority declared
that education is entitled to special treatment in constitutional
law.49 The Court quoted Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke'" that recognized a good faith
presumption for universities: 'good faith' on the part of a university
is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the contrary'."5' Second, the
46. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2338 ("Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under
the Equal Protection Clause.") (emphasis omitted); id. at 2339 (["U]niversities occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition."); id. at 2341 (["Strict scrutiny) must be
calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body diversity
in public higher education."); see id. at 2366 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Before the Court's
decision today, we consistently applied the same strict scrutiny analysis regardless of the
government's purported reason for using race and regardless of the setting in which race was
being used.").
50. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In that case, the Court held unconstitutional the admissions
system of the Medical School of the University of California at Davis. Id. at 271. Justice
Powell announced the judgment of the Court, holding that the system was not narrowly
tailored, although Powell believed that diversity could be a compelling interest which might
allow affirmative action in admissions decisions. See id. at 314, 319-20. Four other justices
concurred in the judgment that the system was unconstitutional, on the ground that Title
VI prohibited racial preferences in admissions decisions. See id. at 421 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and
Rehnquist, JJ.).
51. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19). Justice O'Connor's
reasoning probably shares more in common with Justice Blackmun's opinion in Bakke than
1700
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Court recounted the "substantial benefits" associated with diver-
sity, a conclusion based entirely on what others told the Supreme
Court. That is, the Court relied on findings by the district court,52
social science studies,53 Fortune 500 companies,54 and the United
States military"5 on why diversity in education is needed. Third, the
Court described why education is so important, particularly legal
education.5"
Lastly, the Court concluded that the law school's quest for
diversity imposed no viewpoint stereotypes.57 Justice O'Connor has
expressed in prior opinions on race-conscious activity a concern that
such action reduces all individuals to representing the "majority"
viewpoint associated with their race and assumes stereotypical
individuals.' In an interesting twist, the Court used the focus of
Justice Powell's. See Wendy Parker, The Legal Cost of the 'Split Double Header" of Gratz and
Grutter, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (forthcoming 2004).
52. Id. at 233840. Specifically, the Court noted:
As the District Court emphasized, the Law School's admissions policy promotes
"cross-racial understanding," helps to break down racial stereotypes, and
"enables [students] to better understand persons of different races." ... These
benefits are"important and laudable," because "classroom discussion is livelier,
more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting" when the
students have "the greatest possible variety of backgrounds."
Id. at 233940 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 246i, Grutter (No. 02-241)).
53. Id. at 2340 (citing well-known social science studies on the benefits of diversity).
54. Id. (citing Brief of Amici Curiae 3M et al. at 5, Grutter (No. 02-241); Brief of Amicus
Curiae General Motors at 3-4, Grutter (No. 02-241)).
55. Id. (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Julius W. Becton et al. at 27, Grutter (No. 02-241)).
Becton and his fellow amici were "high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the
United States military." Id.
56. Id. at 2341 ("Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must be
inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all
members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational institutions that
provide the training and education necessary to succeed in America."); see also Gerald Torres,
Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger- View From a Limestone Lodge, 103 COLUM. L. REv.
1596, 1608 (2003) (agreeing with Justice O'Connor).
57. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
58. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,985 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citing jury preemption
cases and concluding that "Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commitment to
eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and reinforcement of racial
stereotypes"); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737,744 (1995) (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 643 (1993) thereinafter Shaw I) (characterizing the harm of racial redistricting as
"threaten[ing] to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and
to incite racial hostility"); Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 (concluding that racial districting
"reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Kennedy's dissents-the idea
that the law school adopted a quota by admitting a "critical mass"
of preferred minority students6 -to counter the problem with
stereotypes. The law school had sought to enroll a critical mass of
preferred nonminority students, a goal achieved by admitting and
enrolling a range of preferred minority students.60 By affecting more
than a token number of preferred minority students, Justice
O'Connor concluded, the law school "saved" these students from
having to be one of the few spokespersons for their race or ethnicity
and imposed no stereotypes.6'
In allowing that diversity can be a compelling governmental
interest the Court granted a great deal of authority to the defen-
dants. Because they work in such an important profession (educa-
tion), because they and others have deemed diversity to be impor-
tant, and because the program affects a large number of students,
the Court agreed that diversity is a compelling governmental
interest. That other educators disagreed on the value of diversity
was of no concern to the majority.62 The decision affords the
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls"); see also Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (majority opinion by Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor,
J.) (declaring that "[wihen the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the
offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race"
have similar voting interests).
59. See supra notes 2-4, infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing the
dissenting opinions in Grutter).
60. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343. The majority and dissents characterized the operation
of admitting a critical mass differently. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority that
"between 1993 and 2000, the number of African-American, Latino, and Native-American
students in each class at the Law School varied from 13.5 to 20.1 percent, a range
inconsistent with a quota." Id. Justice Kennedy found a smaller deviation by focusing on a
shorter period. See id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that from 1995 to 1998,
"[tihe percentage ofenrolled minorities fluctuated only by 0.3%, from 13.5% to 13.8%"). Chief
Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, compared the admittance figures for preferred
minority students with their application figures and found a strong proportionality between
the two. See id. at 2368 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "from 1995 to 2000 the
percentage of admitted applicants who were members of these minority groups closely
tracked the percentage of individuals in the school's applicant pool who were from the same
groups"). For example, in 1995, 9.7% of the law school's applicants were African American,
and 9.4% of the law school's admittees were African American. See id.
61. Id. at 2333-34, 2347.
62. Justice Thomas noted the disagreement among educators about the value of
promoting racial diversity in the education setting, an argument the majority ignored. See
id. at 2358 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "[tihe Court
never acknowledges, however, the growing evidence that racial (and other sorts) of
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judiciary a narrow role-essentially one of affirming a decision by
the law school-with little independent judicial input.
The second step of the strict scrutiny analysis-narrow tailoring
-follows much from the decision that diversity can be a compelling
governmental interest. As with the first prong of strict scrutiny, the
Court recognized that the context of education affects the narrow
tailoring analysis.6 The educational setting would not support a
quota, but the Court deemed the law school's plan too "flexible [and]
nonmechanical" to suffer this fate.64 Once the Court reached this
critical conclusion, a matter beyond the scope of this Article, much
of its narrow tailoring analysis followed from the idea of deference
and its support for educational diversity. The Court considered
three factors common to narrow tailoring: the consideration of race-
neutral alternatives, the burden on nonfavored groups, and the
permanence of the program.
On the issue of the availability of race-neutral alternatives, the
Court primarily stated what defendants need not do to have
adequately considered race-neutral alternatives. Thus, defendants
need not "exhaust ] ... every conceivable race-neutral alternative,"
nor must they adopt race-neutral alternatives contrary to
diversity." The Court declared that programs based on a lottery
or a percentage plan or that devaluate the LSAT or GPA were
contrary to diversity and, therefore, unacceptable race-neutral
alternatives.' Furthermore, a school need not choose between
diversity and its elite status.6 7 Instead, a school must give "serious,
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that
will achieve the diversity the university seeks.' 6 Diversity need not
be short-changed by race-neutral alternatives.
Second, the law school's broad definition of diversity saved
individuals in nonpreferred racial and ethnic groups from any
undue burden. The law school's quest for diversity extended beyond
identified minority groups by including characteristics belonging to
heterogeneity actually impairs learning among black students").
63. Id. at 2341 (holding that narrow tailoring "must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues
raised by the use of race to achieve student body diversity in public higher education").
64. Id. at 2342. But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003).
65. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344.
66. Id. at 2345.
67. Id. at 2344.
68. Id at 2345 (emphasis added).
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all racial and ethnic groups.6 9 Thus, the inclusive definition of
diversity helped insure its constitutionality. Third, on the question
of an end point, the Court gave the defendants the benefit of the
doubt-the Court agreed to "take the Law School at its word" that
it will try its best for the program to end one day.70 The Court
further added its "expect[ation] that 25 years from now, the use of
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today."
71
The dissenting opinions authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas all labeled the idea of
deference as both novel and wrong. 2 Justice Scalia joined in these
portions of the opinions by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas.
Justice Kennedy focused on the matter at length in his opinion.
He concurred that a court's acceptance of a defendant's judgment
that racial diversity improves education was acceptable, but only
69. Id. at 2345-46. Professor Derrick Bell has argued that the entire affirmative action
program benefitted nonpreferred individuals. See Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distractions, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1626 (2003) ("[Justice O'Connor] evidently viewed [the admissions
program] as a benefit and not a burden on nonminorities.").
70. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346.
71. Id. at 2347. This harkens back to Justice Blackmun in Bakke:
I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will come when an
"affirmative action" program is unnecessary and is, in truth, only a relic of the
past. I would hope that we could reach this stage within a decade at the most.
But the story of Brown v. Board of Education, 374 U.S. 483 (1954), decided
almost a quarter of a century ago, suggests that that hope is a slim one.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 403 (1978) (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
72. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. The dissenting Justices disagreed with
the majority on other issues as well. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a dissenting opinion,
which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2365.
His dissent contended that the program was really a quota because the law school sought a
critical mass ofpreferred minority students. See id. at 2365-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia filed an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice
Thomas joined. See id. at 2348. Justice Scalia argued that the benefits of educational
diversity propounded by the majority and the law school were achievable in a wide range of
activities, from the Boy Scouts to public employee settings, and that the majority's opinion
would lead to more litigation. See id. at 2348-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). For a response to Justice Scalia's argument that Gratz and Grutter will increase
litigation, see Parker, supra note 51. Justice Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, which was largely joined by Justice Scalia. See id. at 2350. That
detailed opinion analyzed at length the law school's purported need for educational diversity
based on race. See id. at 2350-66 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy's opinion is discussed infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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when that judgment was supported by empirical evidence.7" He,
in fact, agreed that diversity can be a compelling governmental
interest.74 Justice Kennedy, however, contended that deference
afforded to education officials in Grutter was not justified because
the program was actually a quota that failed the narrow tailoring
test.75 He argued that the majority "confuses deference to a univer-
sity's definition of its educational objective with deference to the
implementation of this goal."76 In other words, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the majority's use of deference precluded the Court
from recognizing the program as an unconstitutional quota.
In sum, the majority afforded the law school a special status in
two decisions: that diversity could be a compelling governmental
interest and that the program was narrowly tailored. The idea of
deferring to education officials finally allowed a race-conscious
program to survive the no longer "strict in theory, fatal in fact" test
of strict scrutiny.77
II. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND LOCAL CONTROL
This Part turns to school desegregation to determine whether
its jurisprudence indicates that Grutter's approach to education
defendants is as new as it has been labeled.78 Specifically, this Part
73. Id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
75. Justice Kennedy argued that the quest for a critical mass, coupled with the law
school's daily reports of the racial composition of the incoming class, resulted in race being
considered without the requisite individual review. See id. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("The consultation of daily reports during the last stages in the admissions process suggests
there was no further attempt at individual review save for race itself.").
76. Id. at 2370-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("By deferring to the law schools' choice of minority admissions programs, the courts will lose
the talents and resources of the faculties and administrators in devising new and fairer ways
to ensure individual consideration.").
77. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
78. Police misconduct, prison conditions, and voting rights litigation also make Grutter's
approach less surprising. See infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text. Likewise, the
special exceptions courts have afforded educators for other constitutional rules reduce the
novelty of the idea of deferring to school officials. See generally James E. Ryan, The Supreme
Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (2000) (concluding that for the First
Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and due process rights, "the Court has characterized the
government as acting in a special capacity-that of educator-and has accordingly given
education officials greater leeway to bend constitutional rights in order to achieve certain
education goals").
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considers "local control" in school desegregation jurisprudence-the
idea, well grounded in American history, that public schools are
best governed locally rather than nationally."9 It chronicles the
history of the Court's key school desegregation opinions, beginning
with Brown H and ending with the Supreme Court's recent cases
on termination of the school desegregation lawsuit. This history
demonstrates that, in the name of local control, courts have crafted
for school officials a special role in defining what it means to be free
from de jure segregation.
A. Brown II
When a case involves the administration of a state's
schools, as federal judges we try to sit on our hands.
- Judge John Minor Wisdom (1962)m0
Valuing local control in school desegregation began remarkably
early, in the 1955 opinion of Brown H.8" That opinion was the
remedial counterpart to Brown I, which exclusively addressed the
legality of de jure school segregation."2 Rather than ordering a
specific remedy, the Brown H Court afforded defendants, who at
this stage were adjudicated wrongdoers, a very unusual authority:"
"School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating,
assessing, and solving these [school desegregation] problems....""
79. See infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
80. Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 1962). Judges Richard
T. Rives and John R. Brown joined Judge Wisdom on that panel. All three judges, along with
Chief Judge Elbert P. Tuttle, were subsequently identified as "The Four'-that is, the four
consistent judicial proponents of civil rights enforcement." David J. Garrow, Visionaries of
the Law: John Minor Wisdom and Frank M. Johnson, Jr., 109 YALE L.J. 1219, 1222 n.21
(2000); see also Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157,
1187 n.210 (2000).
81. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
82. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
83. Typically,judges have the "primary responsibility" for devising the remedy. They may
seek counsel from the parties, but the wrongdoers rarely have any special standing in
crafting the remedy.
84. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19
(1958) ("It is, of course, quite true that the responsibility for public education is primarily the
concern of the States, but it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state
activity, must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements as they
apply to state action.").
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Rather than imposing a national standard, the court ordered the
local school boards to devise the remedy. The defendants' role in
crafting the remedy was certainly not exclusive; the Court identi-
fied lower courts as key players in the remedial process when
defendants failed to fulfill their duty.85 Regarding the terms of
any acceptable remedy, the Court allowed that the remedy would
necessarily differ depending on each community's situation8 6
and should occur "with all deliberate speed." 7 Although southern
leaders had voiced their refusal to recognize the legitimacy of
Brown I, S  they generally expressed relief in Brown Irs articulation
85. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299 ("[Clourts will have to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional
principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further
hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial
appraisal.").
86. See id. ("Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution
of varied local school problems."). The Court further explained the need for "adjusting and
reconciling public and private needs" and the permissibility of "takfing] into account the
public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner." Id.
at 300 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted that local issues would determine the
particular remedy. See id. at 300-01; see also J. HARVIE WnKNSON III, FROM BROWN to
BAKxE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 64-65 (1979) (noting
that the Court in Brown II "thrice suggested that varied local problems and obstacles might
require a varied pace of school desegregation') (citation omitted).
87. Brown HI, 349 U.S. at 301. Many scholars have examined the aftermath of Brown
I and have questioned the allowance of a remedy "with all deliberate speed" and its role in
encouraging massive resistance and delaying desegregation. See supra note 8. The issue of
timing, however, is only part of that history. What has received far less attention, and is the
subject of this section, is what role the judiciary afforded the defendants. The courts largely
gave the defendants a great deal of leeway, not only on the issue of timing, but also on the
more important issue of substance and control.
88. For descriptions of southern responses to Brown I, see PETER IRONS, JIM CROW'S
CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN DECISION 172-80 (2002); BENJAMIN MUSE,
TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE: THE STORY OF INTEGRATION SINCE THE SUPREME COURT'S 1954
DECISION 20-21,24 (1964); LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,THE WARREN COURTAND AMERICAN POLITICS
37-39 (2000); WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 69. Specific acts included school closings and
terminations of state funding laws. See MUSE, supra, ch. 11; WILKINSON, supra note 86, at
82-83, 94, 98-100. Other legislation included
the use of police powers to prevent the admission of Negroes to white public
schools; the placing of schools under the control of the governor or the state
legislature (where it was hopefully calculated they could not be reached by
federal courts); the financing of litigation opposing desegregation; investigation
of pro-integration and pro-segregation activities (with emphasis entirely on the
former); commissions to publicize the "Southern point of view...."
MUSE, supra, at 67-68. Some northern and border school districts quickly and voluntarily
ended racial segregation in their schools. See id. at 22-24. This was also true for some school
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of the process of remedying segregation,89 and the initial history of
Brown II demonstrates why.
Courts demonstrated a basic commitment to prohibiting explicit
segregation by race, the basic principle announced in Brown I. In
all but a handful of district courts,90 courts held unconstitutional
efforts to continue to use race as an explicit factor in admissions. 91
districts in western and southern Texas, where few African Americans lived. See id. at 27.
89. For a discussion of the positive reaction of the South to Brown II, see MUSE,
supra note 88, at 27. One Mississippi attorney stated: "We couldn't ask for anything better
than to have our local, native Mississippi federal district judges consider suits.... Our local
judges know the local situation and it may be 100 years before it's feasible." GARY ORFIELD,
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT 16 (1969); see also C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 153 (2002)
(quoting the Lieutenant Governor of Georgia as saying that federal judges "are steeped in
the same traditions that I am.... A 'reasonable time' can be construed as one year or two
hundred [years] .... Thank God we've got good Federal judges."). The Court's approach in
Brown II was very similar to that advocated by southern states in their briefs. See RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 723-31 (1977).
90. See ORFIELD, supra note 89, at 20. Some southern judges were pointed in their
criticism of Brown I. One of my favorite anecdotes is that of Judge T. Whitfield Davidson who
had this to say when he dismissed the Dallas, Texas school desegregation lawsuit:
I received my first nourishment from a Negro woman's breast. There is no
animosity, no hatred of any kind in my heart. The southern white gentleman
does not feel unkindly toward the Negro.... ITihe white man has a right to
maintain his racial integrity and it can't be done so easily in integrated
schools.... We will not name any date or issue any order.... The School Board
should further study this question and perhaps take further action, maybe an
election.
J. W. PELTASON, FIF'Y-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 118-19 (1961); see also REED SARRATT, THE ORDEALOFDESEGREGATON 201-
02 (1966) (quoting District Court Judge E. Gordon West of Louisiana as saying "the now-
famous Brown I case [is] one of the truly regrettable decisions of all times.... As far as I can
determine, its only real accomplishment to date has been to bring discontent and chaos to
many previously peaceful communities, without bringing any real attendant benefits to
anyone").
91. For example, federal courts quickly held unconstitutional Louisiana's and Virginia's
pupil assignment laws because the states demonstrated a complete unwillingness to abide
on any level with Brown I. A district court held Louisiana's statute unconstitutional because,
inter alia, contemporaneous acts and resolutions indicated that race would be considered,
and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. See Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.
La. 1956), affd, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957). For a history of the Louisiana legislation, see
Daniel J. Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA.
L. REV. 517, 536-39 (1959). Likewise, Virginia's first pupil placement statute was declared
unconstitutional for its unmistakable quest for continued segregation. Adkins v. Sch. Bd.,
148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), affd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1957). That law required all transfer
requests to be "efficient," but declared that integrated schools by definition were inefficient.
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But so long as race was not explicitly stated as a factor, anything
else was deemed permissible. The judiciary readily accepted the
defendants' assurances that student assignment would be race-
neutral, even when evidence strongly indicated otherwise. Courts
also refused to order the admission of African American students to
white schools; instead, they continually deferred to defendants to
make desegregation happen.
This took place in the litigation surrounding pupil assignment
laws. In the aftermath of Brown H, Southern state legislatures
enacted race-neutral pupil assignment laws. Of the eleven former
states of the Confederacy, all but Georgia passed such statutes
from 1954 to 1957.92 Pupil assignment laws, also known as pupil
enrollment acts and pupil placement acts, eliminated race as an
explicit factor in student assignment, thereby revoking prior state
laws requiring schools to be segregated by race.9" Yet, the laws were
designed to continue segregated education. The laws maintained a
student's prior school assignment, which had been based on race.
The statutes permitted individual students to apply for transfers
from their currently assigned school to another school, and local
school boards would decide the requests on race-neutral grounds,
as specified in the statute.94 Thus, no wholesale change of the past
was enacted. The statutes only allowed the possibility of change in
the assignment of individual students.
That possibility was rarely more than an illusion. The statutes
included more than traditional student assignment issues, such as
Id. at 442; see also Meador, supra, at 539-41 (discussing the Virginia legislation). At this
point, a formerly all-white school would be considered integrated with the enrollment of a
single African American student. If an African American student's transfer request to a
white school was for some reason granted, the state would automatically close that admitting
school and terminate all state funds. See Adkins, 246 F.2d at 327; see also infra note 115
(discussing other challenges in which the defendants admitted the continued consideration
ofrace).
92. The ten states and their respective dates of passage are as follows: Alabama (1955),
Arkansas (1956), Florida (1956), Louisiana (1954), Mississippi (1954), North Carolina (1955),
Tennessee (1957), Texas (1957), and Virginia (1956). See Meador, supra note 91, at 527.
93. An excellent student note details these statutes and the resulting legal challenges.
See Note, The Federal Courts and Integration of Southern Schools: Troubled Status of the
Pupil Placement Acts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1453 (1962); see also Meador, supra note 91,
at 571 (reviewing such plans and their legal challenges in the hopes that through these laws
"the schools can find shelter from the storm").
94. See Note, supra note 93, at 1452-53. North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia
only had general standards. Id. at 1477-79.
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capacity and transportation,95 but also race-neutral factors that
could easily be manipulated to produce discriminatory effect. The
statutes allowed local school boards to consider the "academic
preparation," "[sicholastic aptitude and relative intelligence or
mental energy or ability of pupil," and "[p] sychological qualification
of pupil for type of teaching and associations involved.' 6 As if that
were not enough discretion for the school boards, they could also
consider the "[plossibility or threat of friction or disorder among
pupils or others," the "[p] ossibility of breaches of peace or ill will or
economic retaliation within community," the "[miorals, conduct,
health, and personal standards of pupil," and "[oither relevant
matters."" Any transfer request denied was to be appealed first
through state administrative proceedings.98 Only then could the
individual student turn to federal courts."
Remarkably, courts in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits held the
North Carolina and Alabama statutes facially constitutional.1" In
both opinions, the courts were surprisingly willing to accept school
officials' assurances that the pupil assignment laws would not lead
to decisions based on race and were willing to impose substantial
burdens on students.
95. See id. at 1477 (noting that Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas all
had such provisions).
96. See id. at 1477-78 (noting that Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas
all had such provisions).
97. See id. at 1478-79 (noting that Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas
all had such provisions).
98. See id. at 1457-59 (describing review procedures). Despite state statutory provisions
to the contrary, the federal courts did not then require appeal from the adverse
administrative determinations to state courts before a federal court could entertain the suit.
Id. at 1457-58; see, e.g., East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. v. Davis, 287 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.
1961); Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush, 268 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1959); Jackson v. Rawdon, 235
F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1956); Romero v. Weakley, 226 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955). Likewise, federal
courts held invalid state statutory provisions disallowing class action challenges. See, e.g.,
Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1956). The Fourth Circuit required that all
class members and class representatives had to first exhaust administrative remedies. See
Covington v. Edwards, 165 F. Supp. 957 (M.D.N.C. 1958), aft'dper curiam, 264 F.2d 780 (4th
Cir. 1959).
99. See Note, supra note 93, at 1457-58.
100. See Carson, 238 F.2d at 724; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp.
372 (N.D. Ala.) (three-judge court), affdpercuriam, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
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In 1956 in Carson v. Warlick,'0 ' the Fourth Circuit upheld the
North Carolina statute as constitutional on its face regarding the
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The standards themselves
in the statute-"so as to provide for the orderly and efficient
administration of such public schools, the effective instruction of
the pupils therein enrolled, and the health, safety, and general
welfare of such pupils'-were, on their face, acceptable.'0 2 Relying
on Brown II, the Carson court held that "[slomebody must enroll
the pupils in schools.... [We can think of no one better qualified
to undertake the task than the officials of the schools and the
school boards having the schools in charge."103 As a result, African
American or white pupils who wanted to enroll in a school other
than the one to which they had been assigned under a racially
segregated system first had to apply to the school district; if
unsuccessful, appeal through a state administrative proceeding;
and, if still unsuccessful, appeal to a state court jury.'10 This was all
to be determined by race-neutral standards, but ones that allowed
a great deal of discretion. Only individuals who had exhausted this
entire process could finally bring their complaint to a federal
court. 1 This process afforded defendants a great deal of power in
determining what a post-Brown I school would look like, even
though they sought to maintain segregation. Students had to use
the system devised by the defendants and could not directly ask the
101. 238 F.2d at 728 ("It is argued that the Pupil Enrollment Act is unconstitutional; but
we cannot hold that the statute is unconstitutional upon its face and the question as to
whether it has been unconstitutionally applied is not before us, as the administrative remedy
which it provides has not been invoked.").
102. Id. at 728.
103. Id.
104. See Note, supra note 93, at 1456. Thus, regarding the statute as applied, in Carson
the African American students' requests for transfers to the white school had been denied.
Carson, 238 F.2d at 727. The recourse was not a suit in federal court for injunctive relief. See
id. at 728-29. Instead, the students needed to first appeal to the school board through the
administrative process. See id. at 726, 728-29. If the students were still not allowed to enroll
in the white school, then the statute required the students to appeal the case to state court,
with their transfer requests to be decided by a jury. See id. at 726. Then if the North Carolina
jury still denied the request, the students could file a federal suit. See id. at 727. These
procedural requirements were eventually eliminated. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade
of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 194, 206-07 (1964)
(noting the early conflict between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits).
105. The Fifth Circuit imposed smaller procedural hurdles on challenges to pupil
placement laws. See Bickel, supra note 104, at 206.
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federal courts to enroll them in their closest school or any school.
The Fourth Circuit deferred to defendants even in the face of
continued attempts at segregation. Local control trumped any
federal efforts to achieve desegregation.
Similarly, the Alabama statute survived a facial attack in a
narrow opinion by a three-judge court for the Northern District of
Alabama.'O° The court went so far as to presume that the Alabama
legislature intended to comply with the Constitution in passing the
legislation, even though that body in 1956, the year before the pupil
assignment law was enacted, had declared that "the decisions and
orders of the Supreme Court ... relating to separation of races in the
public schools are, as a matter of right, null, void, and of no
effect." °7 Also suspicious was the statutory language that "no child
shall be compelled to attend any school in which the races are
commingled,"0" and with the same "standards" for evaluating
transfer requests as quoted above for North Carolina."°9 Further,
the State Superintendent of Education in this case had written the
plaintiffs a letter detailing the "strengths" of Alabama's African
American schools and questioned "why do you [the parents] want
to change the conditions that produced these gains for you and your
people?"'1 0 Finally, the letter promised "abolishment of the public
schools" if the parents "refuse[d] to cooperate with the city board of
education in the school placement of your children.""' Instead of
asserting federal authority, the court noted the importance of
allowing local and state authorities to solve the "problem""2 of
106. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.) (three-
judge court), affd per curiam, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
107. Id. at 373 n.1, 380 n.9. The court characterized the legislation as "no more than
protest, an escape valve through which the legislators blew off steam to relieve their
tensions." Id. at 381. A similar, but sufficiently different situation existed in Louisiana when
the Fifth Circuit held its pupil enrollment act unconstitutional. See supra note 91 and
accompanying text. In Louisiana, the pupil assignment law was passed immediately after
another law requiring separate schools. See Shuttlesworth, 162 F. Supp. at 376. In Alabama,
however, a year passed between the legislature's repudiation of Brown I and the passage of
its pupil enrollment act. See id. at 373 n.1, 384 n.9.
108. Note, supra note 93, at 1474-75.
109. Id. at 1454-55.
110. Shuttlesworth, 162 F. Supp. at 374.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 379 ("No intellectually honest person would deny that those laws were passed
in an effort to meet and solve problems presented by the School Segregation Cases.").
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Brown I and quoted the language of deference to local educational
authorities found in Brown II and Carson,"' the Fourth Circuit
opinion on North Carolina's act.114 The court thus evidenced a
strong hesitation to question school officials, even when faced
with strong evidence indicating good reason to do so. This allowed
defendants to implement a system designed to perpetuate segrega-
tion with federal court approval.
Subsequent challenges to pupil enrollment acts concerned the
application of the standards to individual students, unlike the
previous facial challenges discussed above. In this round of cases,
lower courts held the school officials in violation of Brown I because
defendant testimony or school policy still admitted the continued
assignment of the vast majority of students based on race."'
113. See supra notes 84, 101-03 and accompanying text.
114. Shuttlesworth, 162 F. Supp. at 383-84. The court further stated:
The School Placement Law furnishes the legal machinery for an orderly
administration of the public schools in a constitutional manner by the
admission of qualified pupils upon a basis of individual merit without regard to
their race or color. We must presume that it will be so administered.... The
responsibility rests primarily upon the local school boards, but ultimately upon
all of the people of the State.
Id. at 384.
115. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 309 F.2d 630,631,633 (4th Cir. 1962)
(holding unconstitutional the continued use of attendance zones based on race as "an
unconstitutional administration of the North Carolina Pupil Enrollment Act," even though
eight African American students (out of 133 applications) had been allowed to transfer to
formerly all-white schools); Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 491,494-95,498, 500
(5th Cir. 1962) (rejecting implementation of Pupil Enrollment Act because school district still
assigned students based on racial enrollment maps); Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 302 F.2d
818, 820, 823-24 (6th Cir. 1962) (holding unlawful discrimination even though thirteen
African American students had been permitted to attend formerly all-white schools because
the school district still used "dual area zone maps, one for white schools and one for Negro
schools"); East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. v. Davis, 287 F.2d 380, 381 (5th Cir. 1961)
(holding the system was unconstitutional despite race-neutral language of Louisiana pupil
placement law because superintendent admitted that enrollment was based solely on race);
Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256,258-59,261 (8th Cir. 1960) (holding law unconstitutional even
though Arkansas's Pupil Assignment Law was race-neutral because the school district
exhibited no intention to change the current enrollment patterns, although noting press
reports of the enrollment of one African American in a formerly all-white school); Gibson v.
Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 272 F.2d 763, 765-66 (5th Cir. 1959) (finding discrimination because
school district failed to give students the opportunity to apply for transfers under pupil
enrollment law); Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268,271-72 (5th Cir. 1957) (holding the Dallas,
Texas school district in violation of Brown I because students' transfer requests under Texas
law were denied "solely on account of their race or color," and assuming future constitutional
behavior by state officials, even though the state had passed a law possibly terminating six
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In only the truly exceptional case would the court order African
American students enrolled in white schools." Instead, the clear
majority of cases ordered that defendants again consider the
transfer applications of the students according to the race-neutral
terms of the pupil enrollment acts."' In fact, one order compelling
"system-wide desegregation" to begin that year-by a district court
judge obviously angry that the Fifth Circuit had reversed his
decision to dismiss the school desegregation lawsuit outright-was
overruled for inadequate deference to the defendants."'
The work of Professor Davison Douglas on North Carolina's
desegregation period provides additional evidence of the judicial
reticence toward imposing judicially crafted remedies on school
desegregation defendants." 9 School districts in North Carolina
million dollars in state funding if Dallas complied with the court order on integration),
overruled in part by United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1967); Beckett v. Sch. Bd., 185 F. Supp. 459, 462 (E.D. Va. 1959) (holding unconstitutional
application of Virginia Pupil Placement Act in Norfolk because "[tihe Board candidly admits
that the race of the child is the controlling factor wherever a child of one race seeks
admission to a school solely or predominantly attended by children of the opposite race"),
affd sub nom. Hill v. Sch. Bd., 282 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1960).
116. See, e.g., Wheeler, 309 F.2d at 631, 633 (ordering admission of 125 students who had
applied for transfers and had been denied); Dillard v. Sch. Bd., 308 F.2d 920, 924-25 (4th Cir.
1962) (ordering admission of seventeen elementary students and affirming district court
order of admission of nine high school students in Charlottesville, Virginia); Jones v. Sch.
Bd., 278 F.2d 72, 73-74, 77 (4th Cir. 1960) (affirming district court order for Alexandria,
Virginia, denying admission to five plaintiffs, while district court order of admission for nine
students not appealed).
117. See, e.g., McCoy v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 283 F.2d 667,668-70 (4th Cir. 1960)
(ordering school district that had admitted African American students to formerly all-white
school, but then transferred the white children to another mostly-white school, to "reassign
the minor plaintiffs to an appropriate school in accordance with their constitutional rights");
Dove, 282 F.2d at 262 (affirming denial of actual enrollment of three student applicants
because "the court was entitled to require in relation to the problem of general achievement,
that the enjoyment of their right to desegregation be geared to a reasonable, definitive,
transitional program of'all deliberate speed"); Gibson, 272 F.2d at 765-67 (ordering that "the
Board may ... submit for the consideration of the district court a plan whereby the plaintiffs
... are hereafter afforded a reasonable and conscious opportunity to apply for admission to
any schools for which they are eligible without regard to their race or color"); Borders, 247
F.2d at 272 (noting that plaintiffs were not even seeking actual admission by court order but
rather an order requiring appellees to desegregate the schools under their jurisdiction "with
all deliberate speed"); see also East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 287 F.2d at 381 (upholding
declaratory judgment of violation and injunction banning illegal practices, but ordering no
additional relief).
118. See Rippy v. Borders, 250 F.2d 690, 691-94 (5th Cir. 1957).
119. See Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric ofModeration: Desegregating the South During
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enjoyed considerable success in federal court litigation. Professor
Douglas found that "by 1960, no North Carolina federal or state
court had ever ruled in favor of a black plaintiff in a school desegre-
gation case."12' This did not mean, however, that race had been
eliminated from the student assignment.1 2' Nor did it mean that
North Carolina schools were generally integrated. In fact, "ten
years after the Brown decision, less than one half of one percent of
the schoolchildren in the state attended school with a child of
another race."'22 Instead, North Carolina's lack of successful African
American plaintiffs demonstrates the deference afforded to public
school officials so long as they were not publicly declaring that race
would still be considered. North Carolina correctly "understood that
voluntary token desegregation and avoidance of statements of
defiance would allow the state to continue with segregated schools
without judicial interference."'2 Lower court judges, in the words
of Judge Wisdom, "sat on their hands, " ' except when faced with
outright defiance. Control by local school boards over the desegrega-
tion process was paramount.
In the immediate aftermath of Brown II, the idea of giving defen-
dants "primary responsibility"' 12 over the desegregation remedy
may have had more of an influence on making the right to be free
from de jure segregation meaningless than on the allowance of a
period of delay. 126 No one at the time treated the idea of "with all
deliberate speed" 27 as one allowing no progress whatsoever toward
the disestablishment of de jure segregation. Rather, the idea was
the Decade After Brown, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 92, 138 (1994).
120. Id. Atlanta, considered to be a moderate Southern city on race relations, enjoyed
judicial success in the Fifth Circuit as well. See Calhoun v. Latimer, 321 F.2d 302 (5th Cir.
1963); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature: A Local Legal History Lesson in
the Salience of Interracial Conflict, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (2003) (discussing the Atlanta
school desegregation cases).
121. Douglas, supra note 119, at 138 (concluding that during the 1950s "every school child
in North Carolina was still assigned to school on the basis of race") (footnote omitted).
122. Id. at 128. Louisiana and Virginia had higher levels of integration "due to adverse
court decisions compelling desegregation." Id. at 95.
123. Id. at 129; see also WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 85 ("Token compliance often
'succeeded' where total defiance fell flat.").
124. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 8, 87 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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promoted to allow a gradual change in the system,128 that is, a
grade or a handful of students each year. By contrast, the idea of
affording defendants primary responsibility for the remedy kept the
judiciary out of the business of ordering any integration, whether
it be for an individual student, or for an entire grade, until the early
1960s, as the next section demonstrates. As a result, extreme
segregation continued.
B. Title VI
The courts acting alone have failed.
- Judge Wisdom (1966)' 29
Faced with, at best, token southern integration, judicial pa-
tience eventually waned. 130 Beginning in 1963, the Supreme Court
repeatedly noted its "exasperation" with the passage of time with
almost no desegregation. ' The days of allowing defendants control
128. See WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 62-65.
129. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966)
(emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Jefferson I]. Judge Wisdom also stated: "A national effort,
bringing together Congress, the executive, and the judiciary may be able to make meaningful
the right of Negro children to equal educational opportunities." Id.
130. See WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 95 ("By the early 1960s, the attitudes of lower
federal courts toward southern evasion became perceptibly less indulgent."). For the eleven
states of the Confederacy, only 1.17% of African American students were enrolled in a
formerly all-white school by 1963. James R. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School
Desegregation in the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42, 42 (1967); see also WILKINSON, supra note 86,
at 65, 102 (noting that "lals late as 1962, not a single Negro attended white schools or
colleges in Mississippi, Alabama, or South Carolina. By 1964--one decade after Brown--a
scant 2.3% of southern blacks were enrolled in desegregated schools") (footnotes omitted).
Texas had the highest level at 5.52%, and seven of the states had less than 1.0%. Dunn,
supra, at 42 n.3. The seven border states had substantially higher levels of integration, with
an overall desegregation rate of 54.8%. Id. This lack of change has led many to question the
utility of courts as agents of social change. See STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIuTS OF THE
LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIL RIGHTS ACT 2-3 (1995); ROSENBERG,
supra note 38, at 52; Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 10-13 (1994).
131. WILINGSON, supra note 86, at 101; see Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965)
(per curiam) (concluding that for Richmond, Virginia, "more than a decade has passed since
we directed desegregation of public school facilities 'with all deliberate speed' .... Delays in
desegregating school systems are no longer tolerable") (citations omitted); Grifflin v. County
Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229, 234 (1964) (noting that for Prince Edward County, Virginia,
"[tihe case has been delayed since 1951 by resistance at the state and county level, by
legislation, and by lawsuits.... The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out"); Goss v. Bd.
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over the remedial process were ending. Lower courts began actively
overseeing school districts starting in the mid-1960s and continuing
through the 1970s. During this period, local control was of little
importance. On one level the judiciary had no choice but to increase
its involvement in the remedial phase in order to implement the
fundamental principle of Brown I. The courts had given public
school officials the chance to discontinue the use of race in student
assignment, a chance largely rejected. The judiciary had many
choices in deciding how to increase its involvement, and the courts,
particularly the Fifth Circuit and eventually the Supreme Court,
made decidedly expansive choices that interjected the judiciary into
educational affairs. Schools had to desegregate all aspects of their
operations, even if that meant busing. This is primarily reflected in
two Supreme Court opinions, Green v. County School Board'32 and
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.l3 3
In 1968 the Supreme Court in Green held that a school district's
freedom-of-choice plan, 13 which had produced little desegregation,
was "unacceptable."135 Speaking in strong language and echoing the
Fifth Circuit's ground-breaking opinion in United States v. Jefferson
of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963) (recognizing that for Knoxville, Tennessee, "eight years
after this decree [of 'with all deliberate speed'] was rendered and over nine years after the
first Brown decision, the context in which we must interpret and apply this language to plans
for desegregation has been significantly altered"). By contrast, in the more recent school
desegregation opinions, the Court emphasizes the longevity of the litigation. See infra note
213 and accompanying text.
132. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
133. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
134. Under freedom-of-choice plans, parents could choose their child's school. See
WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 104; Dunn, supra note 130, at 44, 56, 59, 64-65 (describing the
failure of the freedom-of-choice plans as a desegregation tool).
135. Green, 391 U.S. at 441. In Green, no white student had chosen to attend the African
American school, and 115 African American children had chosen to attend the white school.
Id. (also noting that "85% of the Negro children in the system still attend the all-Negro
Watkins school"); see also WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 109-10 (describing how school
districts discouraged other-race enrollment through freedom-of-choice plans); Comment, The
Courts, HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321, 335 n.50 (1967)
(reporting the failure of other freedom-of-choice plans). Two months before the decision in
Green, the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) had issued
desegregation guidelines indicating that freedom-of-choice plans alone likely were not
enough to comply with Brown. Neal Devins & James B. Stedman, New Federalism in
Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
1243, 1249 n.32 (1984).
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County Board of Education (Jefferson II), 136 the Court held that
"[sichool boards ... operating state-compelled dual systems were ...
clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."137 The concept
of a unitary system included not just student assignment, but
also "faculty, staff, transportation, extra curricular activities and
facilities." 3 ' Desegregation was no longer the responsibility of
students to seek a transfer (under the pupil enrollment acts) or
choose their school (under the freedom-of-choice plans); now the
responsibility of producing actual desegregation lay with school
districts. 3 9 Integration was the expected result, and the failure to
achieve it would result in federally crafted mandates.
In some respects, Green was an easy case to support integration.
At issue was a rural school district with no housing segregation. 140
The district operated two schools, one African American and one
136. 380 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (per curiam) [hereinafter Jefferson II]. In
Jefferson II, the Fifth Circuit adopted the approach of Judge Wisdom's opinion in Jefferson
I. See supra note 129; see also WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 328 n.195. One commentator has
described the Jefferson I opinion as "far and away the most famous and substantively
important of all of John Minor Wisdom's appellate opinions on civil rights." Garrow, supra
note 80, at 1222; see also WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 111 (opining that Judge Wisdom's
opinions in three cases "transformed the face of school desegregation law"); Joel Win.
Friedman, John Minor Wisdom: The Noblest Tulanian of Them All, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1, 25
(1999) (describing Jefferson 11 as one of the cases that was "the cornerstone of the Fifth
Circuit's efforts ... to effect an irrevocable shift away from token desegregation to massive
integration in school systems across the South"); Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the
Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1975, at 7,20 (deeming Jefferson II as one of the cases marking "the most important
doctrinal change in interpretation of the [Elqual [P]rotection [Cilause, as applied to public
education, since Brown itself'). Two earlier cases were also important in changing the
meaning of Brown I to mandating actual integration. See Jefferson I, 372 F.2d 136, 847 (5th
Cir. 1966); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 1965).
137. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
138. See id. at 435.
139. See id. at 441-42 (recognizing that "r] ather than further the dismantling of the dual
system, the [freedom-of-choice] plan has operated simply to burden children and their
parents with a responsibility which Brown H placed squarely on the School Board");
WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 116 (recognizing that Green "removed, at long last, from black
children the onus of achieving integration and threw it squarely-affirmatively--onto the
backs of local school boards").
140. See Green, 391 U.S. at 432.
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white, and extensive busing maintained the separate school
systems."' Neighborhood schools would be integrated.
The remedial reach of Green was exceeded three years later in
Swann."2 In that case, the Supreme Court allowed that not only
may courts order busing as a remedy to achieve the integration
required by Green,"' but that remedies should be designed to
achieve "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation."'"
Swann made explicit that the actual results were crucial in
evaluating a remedy's acceptability." 5 More specifically, the Court
upheld the decision of the district court to give the school board
three alternative plans from which to choose because the school
board's plan did not adequately integrate the elementary schools.146
In essence, the Supreme Court had mounted an attack on contin-
ued segregation, not just the consideration of race. Fundamentally,
the Court redefined the right of Brown Ito include not just the end
of assignment based on race, but also a right to integration. 147 These
two rights would not be thwarted by the defendants, for no longer
did they have the "primary responsibility" of desegregation that
Brown II had envisioned.14 Although the Court in Swann and
Green relied upon the language of Brown H that placed responsibil-
ity on the defendants,149 the Court in those cases was willing to
141. Id.
142. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
143. Id. at 29-31.
144. Id. at 26.
145. Id. at 22-25. Granted, the Court only allowed that "mathematical ratios" may be "a
starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement," id.
at 25, and that not "every school in every community must always reflect the racial
composition of the school system as a whole." Id. at 24.
146. Id. at 9-11, 32.
147. The Court in Green characterized the first stage of Brown as the elimination of race
as a factor in admissions. See Green, 391 U.S. at 435-36. It also recognized a second step-the
creation of a unitary system. Id.; see also HALPERN, supra note 130, at 58 ("What is so critical
about the HEW Guidelines and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Jefferson is that they helped
produce a new understanding of the right established in Brown.").
148. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see also WIUKNSON, supra note 86, at 114
("The detail of Judge Wisdom's 1966 Jefferson decree finally dashed the Supreme Court's
hope in Brown II that school authorities would assume 'the primary responsibility for
elucidating, assessing, and solving' the problems of desegregation.") (footnote omitted)
(quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955)).
149. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 11-13 (quoting extensively from Brown II on the remedial
process); id. at 15 (recognizing the "aflin-mative duty" of the defendants); id. at 16 (concluding
that "[riemedial judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school
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second guess the remedial plans of the defendants. The actual
deference afforded to defendants was practically nonexistent. With
little hesitation, the Court rejected the defendants' remedial plans.
The Court, for the first time, controlled the content of the remedy.
Yet, all three federal branches of government, not just the
judiciary, bear some responsibility for requiring actual integration
at the cost of devaluing local control. The responsibility of the
executive and legislative branches began with the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,150 which was designed, in part, to promote
actual desegregation of formerly de jure segregated schools."'
Through Title VI of the Act,5 2 Congress enacted legislation that
required the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
to ensure that school districts desegregate or lose federal funding.
Title IV authorized the Department of Justice (DOJ)-through the
Attorney General-to litigate school desegregation cases.13 HEW's
1966 Guidelines for defining whether schools were desegregating
required actual integration,5 4 and DOJ supported the Guidelines
authorities whose powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority
defaults"); id. at 21 (noting that "[iun devising remedies where legally imposed segregation
has been established, [desegregation] is the responsibility of local authorities and district
courts"); Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (placing an "affirmative duty" on defendants); id. at 439
(seeking a proposed plan from the defendants); id. at 442 (requiring the school board to
formulate the needed policy).
150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 to 2000h (2000).
151. For a detailed examination of legislative history demonstrating that the purpose of
Title VI was to further school desegregation, see HALPERN, supra note 130, at 22-33.
152. Title VI specifically provides in pertinent part, that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
153. Id. § 2000c-6.
154. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 181.1-.76 (1967); see also id. §§ 80.1-.13 (effectuating Title VI's
nondiscrimination provisions); HALPERN, supra note 130, at 52-58 (describing the Guidelines
in detail). The HEW 1966 Guidelines accepted the South's preferred method of desegregation,
freedom-of-choice, as an option for de jure school districts. See 45 C.F.R. § 181.54. Under the
Guidelines, however, the freedom-of-choice plans had to abide by specified requirements
regarding the process of choice. Id. Even more dramatic was the requirement of actual,
specified outcomes for any plan to be acceptable. See id. Specifically,
[tihe Guidelines recommended that districts with 8 to 9 percent integration in
the 1965-66 school year should attempt to double that in the 1966-67 academic
year, that districts with 4 to 5 percent integration in 1965-66 should try to
triple that figure in the following year, and that those with less than 4 percent
integration (primarily districts in Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia,
South Carolina, and Arkansas) should make a "substantial" effort to catch up
1720
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in litigation. 155 The Fifth Circuit in Jefferson II strongly endorsed
the HEW 1966 Guidelines.156 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit implied
that HEW had superior competency in defining what desegregation
should entail, 57 and that courts should defer to Congressional will,
as expressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.158 Only then did the
Supreme Court adopt as well the command that ending de jure
segregation would entail meaningful integration. 159
In sum, all three federal branches decided that enforcing Brown
I should produce widespread integration. No branch emphasized
local control. The executive branch through HEW and DOJ advo-
cated a broader reading of Brown I than had been enforced
previously. The federal judiciary, first by the Fifth Circuit and then
by the Supreme Court, began to require for the first time specific,
affirmative steps to integrate after HEW and DOJ so advocated. In
with the leading desegregated districts.
HALPERN, supra note 130, at 52-53 (footnote omitted); see 45 C.F.R. § 181.54. The numbers
were not absolute requirements, but indications of the effectiveness of the plan. Dunn, supra
note 130, at 63 n.113. For the first time, HEW was also requiring desegregation of faculty.
See 45 C.F.R. § 181.13(b)-(d). Thus, HEW demanded a plan designed to produce actual
desegregation before allowing disbursement of federal funds. The South vehemently opposed
the HEW 1966 Guidelines. See HALPERN, supra note 130, at 54-56; WILKINSON, supra note
86, at 104-05; Dunn, supra note 130, at 44-45; Comment, supra note 135, at 357.
155. See Comment, supra note 135, at 329. Judge Wisdom readily admitted his close
working relationship with the DOJ. See Garrow, supra note 80, at 1229 n.73. The DOJ
worked to apply Jefferson I and II to other cases. See Comment, supra note 135, at 338.
156. See Jefferson II, 380 F.2d 389, 390 (5th Cir. 1967).
157. See id. at 400 n.6 ("[Mlost judges do not have sufficient competence-they are not
educators or school administrators-to know the right questions, much less the right
answers."); Jefferson I, 372 F.2d 836, 858 (5th Cir. 1966) ("It is evident to anyone that the
Guidelines were carefully formulated by educational authorities anxious to be faithful to the
objectives of the 1964 Act."); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729,
731 (5th Cir. 1965) (reasoning that "[aibsent legal questions, the United States Office of
Education is better qualified than the courts and is the more appropriate federal body to
weigh administrative difficulties inherent in school desegregation plans"); HALPERN,
supra note 130, at 62-65 (detailing this aspect of the Fifth Circuit's opinions); see also Price
v. Denison Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 384 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1965) (supporting
administrative enforcement of school desegregation because that is "largely where it ought
to be-in the hands of the Executive and its agencies*).
158. Jefferson 1, 372 F.2d at 852 ("We read Title VI as a congressional mandate for
change-change in pace and method of enforcing desegregation."); id. at 856 ("When
Congress declares national policy, the duty the two other coordinate branches owe to the
Nation requires that, within the law, the judiciary and the executive respect and carry out
that policy."). But see id. at 910 (Cox, J., dissenting) (arguing that the judiciary was
abdicating its constitutional authority).
159. See supra notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
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addition, the Supreme Court rejected any appeals for delay in
producing integration."6 As a result, and for the first time, the
South integrated its public schools.'
C. Milliken I, Milliken II, and Jenkins II
The Supreme Court may have strayed from valuing local control
in Swann and Green, but only briefly. The Court retreated quickly
to enforcing local control with great consequences in its 1974
opinion in the Detroit school desegregation lawsuit, Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken I).162 The district court and court of appeals had
allowed the remedy for Detroit, a majority African American school
district, to include fifty-three surrounding school districts that
were predominately white. " Having the remedy reach all fifty-four
school districts was the only feasible way of offering integrated
education to Detroit public school students.'" The Supreme Court
reversed. 165
The Court's opinion referenced well-known remedial principles
in reversing, but the principles fail to explain the decision. For
example, the Court stated the rule that the scope of the violation
determines the scope of the remedy.166 Yet, this principle and the
others mentioned by the Court are almost universally condemned
for their indeterminacy in public law context. 167 The standards
can support any number of remedies, sometimes even conflicting
ones.'6
160. See Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290,291 (1970) (reversing an
order delaying the merger of student bodies into unitary system by six months); Alexander
v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (vacating an order delaying
desegregation for four months). Uncertainty over the terms of the orders still remained. See
WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 122 (listing questions which remained open after Alexander
and Carter).
161. See WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 121 (reporting that "Ibly 1971, according to HEW
estimates, 44 percent of Negro pupils attended majority white schools in the South as
opposed to 28 percent who did so in the North and West").
162. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) [hereinafter Milliken I].
163. Id. at 739-40.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 753.
166. Id. at 738.
167. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
168. For example, in the case challenging the constitutionality of the all-male admissions
policy at the state school of Virginia Military Institute (VMI), the author of the majority
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Rather, concerns of judicial competency and local control com-
pelled the Court's decision. Consolidating fifty-four school districts
created a number of serious implementation problems, and the
Court questioned the district court's competency to handle these
issues: "[Tihe District Court will become first, a de facto 'legislative
authority' to resolve these complex questions, and then the 'school
superintendent' for the entire area. This is a task which few, if any,
judges are qualified to perform .... ."'9 Continuing, the Court
emphasized the federalism implications of such a role "which would
deprive the people of control of schools through their elected
representatives."170 As a result, the Court held that school district
boundary lines matter when crafting the school desegregation
remedy, even with the State as a liable defendant.7 School district
lines must be respected in the remedial process and cannot be
changed, absent proof of discrimination crossing school district
lines.'72
opinion (Justice Ginsburg) and the author of the concurring opinion (Chief Justice Rehnquist)
both agreed that the remedy should place the victims of the violation in the place they would
have been but for the violation. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547-48 (1996)
(Ginsburg, J., for the majority); id. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). Yet,
the two disagreed on the nature of the violation, and thus disagreed over potential
constitutional remedies. See id. at 550-51 (Ginsburg, J., for the majority) (defining the
violation as the exclusion of women from a state-funded school); id. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment) (defining the violation as the failure to provide women a
comparable education from a state-funded school). Justice Ginsburg required the remedy to
include the admission of women to VMI. See id. at 557-58. Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed
that admission of women should be the remedy in this case, but allowed that in a different
case a comparable school for women would be an acceptable remedy as well. See id. at 565
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
169. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 743-44.
170. Id. at 744. The Court also noted that:
No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control
over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential
both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools
and to quality of the educational process.... [W]e observed that local control over
the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to participate in
decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs,
and encourages "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for
educational excellence."
Id. at 741-42.
171. Id. at 741.
172. This could occur in at least two situations: "Thus an interdistrict remedy might be
in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial
segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on
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As a result, the values of competency and local control greatly
restricted the authority of federal courts. The judiciary would
confine its authority within school district boundary lines, even if
that meant continued segregation. Keeping school desegregation
remedies almost always within school district boundary lines has
had profound practical consequences. Many blame Milliken I for
ending any chance for meaningful integration in large northern
cities. 173
The concern with local control continued when the Supreme
Court returned to the remedy for de jure school segregation in
Detroit in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I). 74 Given that the schools
would be largely segregated, at issue was whether the remedy could
reach non-student assignment issues. The school district had
proposed compensatory education programs to redress problems in
the academic program caused by de jure segregation,'75 along with
a limited student reassignment plan to redress segregation in
Detroit's predominantly white schools.'76 The State defendants,
which had been held liable for Detroit's de jure segregation and
for one-half of the costs of any desegregation plan, protested the
school district's plan. 177 After the district court approved the school
district's plan and the court of appeals affirmed, the State defen-
dants sought Supreme Court review. 178
The Supreme Court upheld the compensatory education rem-
edy. 179 The Court developed a three-part test for evaluating a school
desegregation remedy, with the third element explicitly recognizing
the basis of race." Id. at 745.
173. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation ofAmerican Public
Education: The Courts'Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1607-09 (2003). For a brief argument that
local school district boundary lines should not tie the hands of judges redressing a state's
illegality, see Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1875 n.99 (1994).
174. 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken II].
175. The school district was then 71.5% African American. Id. at 271 n.3.
176. See id. at 271-72. By contrast, the plaintiffs' proposed plan focused exclusively on
reassigning students to produce more student integration than the defendants' proposal.
Id. at 271.
177. Id. at 272-73, 289-90.
178. Id. at 279. The State of Michigan was not a named defendant. Id. at 272 n.6. Instead,
Michigan's governor, attorney general, state superintendent of public instruction, state
treasurer, and state board of education were named. Id.
179. Id. at 291.
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a role for the defendants.'8" The Supreme Court required that the
"federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the
interests of state and local authorities in managing their own
affairs, consistent with the Constitution."' This third element was
clearly satisfied in Milliken II because the school board had
proposed the compensatory education program- hence, the remedy
originated with the school district, which evidenced not only some
degree of control over, but also some sense of participation in, the
remedial process.'82 The Court recognized that educational pro-
grams are "normally left to the discretion of the elected school board
and professional educators"' and that "principles of federalism
[are not] abrogated by the decree,"8 4 which was almost entirely
based on the school board's proposed remedy.
The opinion, however, was not a wholesale adoption of local
control. The federal judiciary also ordered the state defendants to
fund programs without their consent.'" With little effort, the Court
rejected the state defendants' Tenth Amendment argument, 8 6
Eleventh Amendment contention,' and general federalism
150. See id. at 280-81. The first two elements concerned the scope of the remedy:
[Tihe nature of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and
scope of the constitutional violation .... [Tihe decree must indeed be remedial
in nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible "to restore the
victims ... to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such
conduct."
Id. at 280 (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (citations omitted)). These two
elements are discussed infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text.
181. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280-81.
182. See id. at 281 ("[Pletitioners do not contend, nor could they, that the prerogatives of
the Detroit School Board have been abrogated by the decree, since of course the Detroit
School Board itself proposed incorporation of these programs in the first place."). Rather, the
state defendants contended that the remedy was beyond the scope of the violation. See id.
at 281. Interestingly, the Court rejected that argument, partly on the grounds that the school
district itself would properly know the effects of the segregated system. Id. at 287 ("[Tlhe
District Court was adopting specific programs proposed by local school authorities, who must
be presumed to be familiar with the problems and the needs of a system undergoing
desegregation.").
183. Id. at 282.
184. Id. at 291.
185. Id. at 278-79, 291.
186. See id. at 290-91. Because the state defendants' conduct was unlawful, the Tenth
Amendment was not violated by the federal court judgment. See id.
187. The state defendants argued that the Eleventh Amendment immunized them from
paying for the compensatory program. Id. at 288-89. The Court held that the state
defendants could be held responsible for the costs of implementing the compensatory
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complaint that the state defendants should not be required to
fund partially the compensatory education programs."' While local
control principles would affect the content of the remedy, as the
Milliken II test commanded, local control and federalism principles
would not affect the enforcement of the remedy. The state defen-
dants would be obligated to fund their portion, even under protest.
For without funding by the adjudicated wrongdoers, the remedy
would obviously fail.
Giving a school district the ability to propose a remedial plan, to
which the courts would give deference, creates an obvious incentive
for school districts to propose expensive remedial plans when the
state is liable for funding. Kansas City, Missouri, the site of the
most expensive school desegregation case, aptly demonstrates
this incentive."19 The school district and State of Missouri shared
fiscal responsibility for the remedy, and the school district lacked
adequate funds to meet its court-ordered financial responsibili-
ties."90 The issue became the federal court's authority to enable a
school district to tax at a rate sufficient to implement the remedy.
The Supreme Court decided the matter with little respect for
state control over tax laws in Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins 11). 191 On
education programs under the Eleventh Amendment because the relief was entirely
prospective. See id. at 288-90. Under the Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
in Edelman v. Jordan, a state defendant may be subject to prospective injunctive relief, but
not retrospective monetary relief. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,658-78 (1974). It is
certainly plausible that the Milliken II Court could have characterized the order as
retrospective monetary relief because the money was designed to redress a past illegality.
Instead, the Court characterized the relief as redressing present and future harm, thus
coming within Edelman's allowance of prospective relief. See Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 289-90;
see also James M. Hirschhorn, Where the Money Is: Remedies to Finance Compliance with
Strict Structural Injunctions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1858-60 (1984) (reconciling Milliken Il
and Edelman).
188. Millihen II, 433 U.S. at 291. Lastly, the Court found no violation of federalism
principles because "[tihe District Court has neither attempted to restructure local
governmental entities nor to mandate a particular method or structure of state or local
financing." Id.
189. See generally Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale
of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 492-95 (1999) (describing in detail the funding
of Kansas City's court-ordered remedial plan).
190. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) [hereinafter Jenkins II].
191. Id. For an argument that Jenkins II is inconsistent with recent federalism decisions
by the Supreme Court, see Janice C. Griffith, Judicial Funding and Taxation Mandates: Will




the grounds of comity, the Court held that the district court itself
could not raise the school district's property tax rate. 192 Such an
approach "not only intruded on local authority but circumvented
it altogether."193 Yet, the district court could enjoin state laws
preventing the school district from setting a sufficient property tax
rate (for example, laws requiring voter approval)."19 The Court then
characterized the resulting tax not as a federal court tax, but a
school district tax. Enjoining state laws was entirely permissible,
according to the Court, because it was necessary to enable a local
government to fulfill its constitutional duty under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 195 State tax laws could not be allowed to stand in the
way of the school district's constitutional duty to desegregate. The
Court concluded that "tlo hold otherwise would fail to take account
of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy
Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on
them."' 96 In short, a federal court cannot itself raise taxes, but it
can order state and local governments to fund a remedy and enjoin
any restricting state law.
This is a remarkable holding given the American tradition of
"no taxation without representation." The Court could have imposed
more of the financial burden on the State of Missouri, which it had
actually requested the judiciary to do.' 97 Instead, by allowing a
school district to increase its property tax rate without compliance
with state laws, the Court placed almost no value on state control
over rules of taxation. True, the Court stressed that its approach of
not having the federal court itself set the tax rate afforded the
defendants power over the remedy, but the idea of a federal court
192. Jenkins 11, 495 U.S. at 50-52.
193. Id. at 51.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 57.
196. Id. The Court argued that
[tihe difference between the two approaches is far more than a matter of form.
Authorizing and directing local government institutions to devise and
implement remedies not only protects the function of those institutions but, to
the extent possible, also places the responsibility for solutions to the problems
of segregation upon those who have themselves created the problems.
Id. at 51.
197. The State of Missouri made this argument, but the Court found no abuse ofdiscretion
by the district court in not taking this route. See id. at 53-54.
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involving itself in local tax matters is hard to square with the
traditional value of local and state autonomy over taxes.
As with requiring the state defendants to bear a financial burden
for the remedy in Milliken II, the Court promoted strong enforce-
ment power. In a sense, Jenkins II is not about the right or the
remedy to be free of racial discrimination in education, but about
how to enforce the remedy. For without adequate funding, the
remedy could not be enforced. Further, the local control at issue is
not one of defining the right to be free from racial discrimination-
the heart of school desegregationjurisprudence-but the power over
local tax rates, a different matter altogether.
In sum, in Milliken I and II, the Supreme Court devised remedial
standards that emphasized the importance of involving the defen-
dants in the remedial process'98 and in limiting the extent of the
intrusion of the federal government in school operation.'" It
returned to the idea of defendant responsibility propounded by
Brown II and rejected by Green and Swann.2" As a result, defen-
dants have had a remarkable level of authority in devising school
desegregation remedies.0 1 Yet, on the issue of enforcement, as
reflected in the treatment of the state defendants in Milliken II and
Jenkins II, the Court has had no concern with local control. In these
two instances, federal power clearly trumped local and state
authority.
D. Unitary Status
This section considers the Supreme Court's last three school
desegregation opinions, all of which concern the end point of the
school desegregation lawsuit. The Supreme Court has held that
school desegregation lawsuits are not to operate in perpetuity. At
some point in time, the school desegregation lawsuit must end, and
the courts must restore complete local control over schools. Strong
hints of this result began as early as Brown I," and the Supreme
198. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 84-85, 139, 148-50 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
202. See Brown II, 347 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (identifying the purpose of the remedy "to
effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system," and limiting court
1728 [Vol. 45:1691
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Court developed a test for terminating school desegregation cases
in the 1991 opinion in Board of Education v. Dowell,"' the
Oklahoma City school desegregation lawsuit. The end point of
school desegregation is when the school district has achieved
"unitary status" and no longer operates a dual system. 0 4 In
devising Dowell's three-part test for unitary status, the Court
highlighted the temporary nature of school desegregation remedies
and the "allocation of powers within our federal system."2 5 A school
desegregation suit could end, even if it meant immediate resegrega-
tion of the schools.2 'o In reaching this conclusion, the Court
emphasized the importance of local control over schools as part of
the American system of federalism.2 7
Likewise, in Freeman v. Pitts, the Court declared that the "end
purpose" and "ultimate objective" of the lawsuit was to "return
jurisdiction to "this period of transition"); see also Raney v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 449
(1968) (allowing jurisdiction to continue "until it is clear that disestablishment [of de jure
segregation] has been achieved").
203. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
204. Id. at 244-46 (noting different uses of the term "unitary," but recognizing an end point
to school desegregation cases).
205. Id. at 248. Justice Marshall, in his last school desegregation opinion, criticized the
majority's approach to local control. Id. at 267 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He defined local
control as relevant only as to the feasibility of the remedy. Id.
206. See id. at 242 (recognizing that the school board's new plan would resegregate
schools).
207. In rejecting a more restrictive standard for terminating school desegregation
injunctions based on United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932), the Court reasoned
as follows:
Considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system, we
think, support our view that the quoted language from Swift does not provide
the proper standard to apply to injunctions entered in school desegregation
cases. Such decrees, unlike the one in Swift, are not intended to operate in
perpetuity. Local control over the education of children allows citizens to
participate in decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs
can fit local needs.... Dissolving a desegregation decree after the local
authorities have operated in compliance with it for a reasonable period of time
properly recognizes that "necessary concern for the important values of local
control of public school systems dictates that a federal court's regulatory control
of such systems not extend beyond the time required to remedy the effects of
past intentional discrimination."
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 (citations omitted) (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.,
611 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The Court's approach
closely parallels the values associated with state and local authority over a matter, as
opposed to national power. See infra notes 314-22 and accompanying text.
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school districts to the control of local authorities.""' The Court
allowed that this should occur even if schools were never desegre-
gated20 9 and again emphasized the value of federalism.210 Finally,
in Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), the Court stressed the
importance of local control,2 11 and accepted disparities in the
achievement of minority and white school children.212 The message
of the Supreme Court's recent school desegregation opinions is
clear. All three start with a statement of the longevity of the case,
recognize continued segregation, and ultimately afford immediate
return of complete local autonomy.21
3
Lower courts have gotten the Supreme Court's message, and have
proven willing to dismiss school desegregation lawsuits. Complete
local control is returning. A recent ten-year study of district court
opinions and the appeals of these opinions demonstrated that every
request for unitary status was granted, save one in which the court
awarded only "partial" unitary status.
214
208. 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992); see also id. at 490 ("As we have long observed, 'local
autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition."') (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977)).
209. See id. at 476 (permitting continued school segregation because it was not the result
of defendants' actions, but the result of purely private housing choices).
210. The Court relied on the values of federalism in emphasizing the importance of local
control over schools: "When the school district and all state entities participating with it in
operating the schools make decisions in the absence ofjudicial supervision, they can be held
accountable to the citizenry, to the political process, and to the courts in the ordinary course."
Id. at 490.
211. See Jenkins III, 515 U.S. 80,99 (1995) ("[O1ur cases recognize that local autonomy
of school districts is a vital national tradition ....").
212. See id. at 101-02.
213. See id. at 73 (starting the opinion with'[as this school desegregation litigation enters
its 18th year); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471 (recognizing in the second paragraph of the opinion
that the school district has been subject to a school desegregation order since 1969); Bd. of
Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,240 (1991) (stating in the second paragraph of the opinion that
the lawsuit "began almost 30 years ago"). By contrast, opinions issued in the 1970s
emphasized that the time for desegregation was now. See supra note 131 and accompanying
text.
214. See Wendy Parker, TheDeclineofJudicialDecisionmaking School Desegregation and
District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1633 (2003). One small school district in
suburban Pittsburgh, Woodland Hills School District, sought unitary status in all respects,
but was granted unitary status in only particular areas. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 118 F.
Supp. 2d 577, 614-15 (W.D. Pa. 2000). This is called "partial unitary status" and is
specifically allowed byFreeman. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490-91(1992). Interestingly, many
school districts have decided not to seek unitary status. See Parker, supra note 80, at 1212-13
(discussing the reasons for this occurrence).
1730
2004] CONNECTING THE DOTS 1731
E. Summary and Implications of Local Control
Overall, the federal judiciary has valued local control in school
desegregation cases. In the name of local control over schools,
courts have crafted for defendants a prominent role in the remedial
process. Even critics of institutional reform litigation have some-
times admitted the importance of local control in school desegrega-
tion.215 While local control has not mattered at every juncture, the
federal judiciary has deferred to defendants' wishes a great deal,
with profound implications.
In the first decade or so of school desegregation, courts were
exceptionally deferential to school authorities. Granted, the
Supreme Court placed the judiciary at the school house door when
it interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit de jure
segregated schools. Yet, the judiciary's authority to interpret the
Equal Protection Clause is largely unquestioned,216 and the
215. See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 683 (1982) (concluding that "the lesson of the last
decade is that even in race cases the Court has to some degree sought to limit the occasions
for federal judicial intervention, and has sporadically sought to control the scope of the
district courts' discretion"); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 715, 766 (1978) (focusing criticism on prison conditions cases and concluding that
"twenty-four years after Brown, the cases seem instead to demonstrate an extraordinarily
patient recognition of the need for local responsibility and of the practical restraints the
localities face in achieving compliance with the constitutional mandate"); see also Robert F.
Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV.
661,717 (1978) (concluding that Millien I and other non-school desegregation opinions "have
been sensitive to separation of powers considerations, although [their] explanations have not
referred to that doctrine").
216. Marbury v. Madison established that "ilt is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("Marbury v. Madison ... declared the basic principle
that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system."). But see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSITION AWAY FROM THE CouRTs 175 (1999) (affording the federal judiciary no role in
enforcing the Constitution). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778-88
(1991) (examining the current meaning of Marbuy); Marbury v. Madison-: A Bicentennial
Symposium, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003) (exploring Marbury from multiple perspectives).
Other branches of the national government and the states themselves can certainly limit
that authority. Congress, for example, can use its powers under Section 5 of the Equal
Protection Clause to declare unlawful more than that proscribed by the Supreme Court. See
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involvement of the judiciary largely ended with that interpretation.
The courts proved unwilling to enter the school building to oversee
the desegregation process. The courts announced the rule, but
allowed the schools to ascertain what that rule exactly meant and
how to best implement that rule. Judges demanded only that the
schools stop student assignment explicitly based on race, and gave
the school districts the time and opportunity to choose how to
effectuate that objective. As a result, defendants who were willing
at least to pretend to quit assigning students based on race, like
ones in North Carolina, were able to avoid any judicial oversight.217
Defendants not willing to do so-and included here were the
majority of school districts subject to litigation-were told to stop
considering race, but with little judicial involvement in actualizing
that demand.21 Judicial remedial orders specifying the necessary
steps to desegregate were relatively rare; instead, courts told school
officials to try again to desegregate.219 Not surprisingly, children
continued to attend segregated schools.
The judiciary took a very different approach starting in the mid-
1960s. The Supreme Court in Green and Swann paid little heed to
the value of local autonomy over school districts.22 ° Although
language in both opinions stressed the need for local control over
schools and allowed defendants primary responsibility over the
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (holding that Congress can prohibit the use of
certain literacy tests for voter eligibility although the Supreme Court had upheld the
constitutionality of such tests); see also City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting
Katzenbach through a narrow reading of the scope of Congressional power under Section 5).
The Executive Branch can use its pardon power to invalidate a criminal penalty that the
Executive Branch, in disagreement with the judiciary, believes to be unconstitutional. See
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 228-61 (1994) (advocating executive review). States and Congress can
pass constitutional amendments to invalidate the Supreme Court's constitutional
commandments. For example, in response to Chisholm v. Georgia, the states and Congress
passed the Eleventh Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (disallowing suits such as that
in Chisholm); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (upholding a federal court suit
by an individual to collect money from a state). Finally, Congress can also limit key aspects
of the federaljudiciary's jurisdiction. Seegenerally U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Nonetheless, the
national judiciary is principally charged with the power to interpret the Constitution under
Marbury.
217. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
220. See supra Part II.B.
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school desegregation remedy, local control was of nominal effect.22 '
In both opinions, the Court second guessed the educators' decisions
about how to best fulfill the requirements of Brown I and approved
court-crafted remedies.222
In Green, the Court had good reason to suspect that the defen-
dants' remedy of a freedom-of-choice plan was intended to perpetu-
ate segregation, although the plan allowed limited integration.223
The Court took the opportunity to offer, for the first time, an
expansive definition of Brown I, focusing on integration as the
expected goal.22 ' The Court began, in other words, to enter the
schoolhouse to require wholesale integration.
Swann limited the defendants' role even more than Green.22 ' In
Swann, the defendant school district had offered a relatively strong
school desegregation remedial plan, but the Supreme Court paid
little attention to that plan, instead focusing on, and affirming, the
district court's order of widespread busing.226 The Supreme Court
gave little attention to the school district's preferences about how
to desegregate. In both Green and Swann, the Court defined
expansively what it meant to desegregate, at the expense of altering
the role of the defendants as articulated in Brown II.
Perhaps with the overwhelming majority of school districts
abdicating the opportunity to take the desegregation responsibility
seriously, the courts had no choice but to increase their involvement
or risk the effective overruling of Brown I by recalcitrant school
districts. The courts, however, certainly increased their involvement
in public schools more than absolutely necessary. Swann, after all,
involved a far-from-obstructionist school district.227 The Supreme
Court in Green and Swann recognized that Brown II placed the
primary responsibility for desegregation on the defendants, but the
Court's approaches in the opinions were inconsistent with that
primary responsibility.
221. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 138-39, 145-46 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (focusing on the lack of busing for
elementary school students and indicating that the school district in Swann bused middle
and high school students to achieve integration).
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The shift in Green and Swann from Brown H regarding which
level of government should have primary remedial authority-the
local school districts or the federal judiciary-is best explained by
a newly discovered need for a national standard, one mandating
actual integration.228 Once local control was deemed a failed
experiment because it perpetuated segregation, then the judiciary
asserted its own authority to assert a national rule. Certainly, the
support of the other two branches of the national government eased
the way for the judiciary to impose more judicial oversight;29 but
this support only partially answers why the judiciary changed its
approach. The courts decided that more active national oversight
was necessary because affording the defendants primary responsi-
bility had failed, and it had failed, according to the judiciary,
because of the lack of actual integration, 2 0 not because of some
change in the opportunity to actualize the values supporting state
and local government authority. In both Green and Swann, the
Court presumed that a successful desegregation remedy would
result in largely integrated schools. The freedom-of-choice plan was
ineffective because of its outcome; a successful plan, a constitutional
plan, would result in greater levels of integration. 1' Further, in
Swann, the district court's remedy was constitutional because it
produced the greatest possible level of integration.232 Constitutional
desegregation remedies must expect integration.3 3
Underlying Green and Swann, and subsequent Supreme Court
cases on proving the cause of segregation in the North,234 was a
228. According to the principles of federalism, the national government should have
primary authority whenever a national standard is necessary. See infra notes 320-22 and
accompanying text (exploring when federalism endorses national power). The federalism
values supporting state and local authority-public participation in democracy, promotion
of experimentation, prevention of tyranny, and allowance of shared communities-have equal
applicability in Brown i, Green, and Swann. See infra notes 314-19 and accompanying text
(discussing when federalism supports state and local authority). The only possible, relevant
change that could explain the shift in Green and Swann is that the federal judiciary decided
that a uniform standard was needed.
229. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part II.D.
231. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
234. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). In this pair of cases, the Supreme Court articulated powerful
causation presumptions that greatly lessened the burden of proving intentional segregation
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presumption that absent the present-day effects of discrimination,
schools would be integrated. 235 Defendants, therefore, had the legal
responsibility to produce integration. Courts could not defer to
school officials who were not pursuing the plan producing the
"greatest" degree of desegregation and be true to this principle. In
short, a belief that desegregation should entail integration trumped
the idea of local control in Brown II.
Since Swann and Green, however, local control has mattered,
with the exception of the Court's treatment of enforcement powers
in Jenkins H and Milliken 11.236 Certainly, school districts cannot
argue local control to escape Swann and Green, and this is a critical
limitation on defendants. In the implementation of Swann and
Green, however, the federal judiciary has been generally respectful
of public school officials. In fact, the recent unitary status cases
have greatly restricted the reach of Swann and Green by accepting
segregation as an outcome.2 7
In Milliken I, federalism and competency concerns kept the
judiciary out of desegregating predominantly minority city school
systems surrounded by white suburban school districts.23' The
Supreme Court decided to respect local school district boundary
(a prerequisite for judicial oversight) in northern school districts. First, systemwide
discrimination is presumed (absent persuasive counterproof) from discrimination in a
substantial part of the system. See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 455-58 ("Proof of purposeful and
effective maintenance of a body of separate black schools in a substantial part of the system
itself is prima facie proof of a dual school system and supports a finding to this effect absent
sufficient contrary proof by the Board."). Second, and more importantly in the later stages
of litigation, once a violation is found, any current disparity is presumed to be caused by the
defendants' unlawful actions, unless the defendants prove that their actions in no way
contributed to the disparity. See Dayton, 443 U.S. at 537 (holding the defendants responsible
for current segregation if the segregation "was caused at least in part by [the defendants']
prior intentionally segregative official acts"). These presumptions are greatly lessened today.
See Parker, supra note 80, at 1172-73; James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social
Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1672-73 (2003).
235. See Parker, supra note 80, at 1172-73; Ryan, supra note 234, at 1666.
236. Jenkins Irs strong abdication of federalism values-allowing a federal court judge
to have substantial influence over taxation rates--appears strongly inconsistent with the
long tradition ofpromoting democracy and preventing tyranny over matters of taxation. See
supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text. Yet, the Supreme Court decided that another
value, affording the judiciary strong enforcement powers, was more important than exclusive
state and local control over taxing legislation. See generally infra Part IV.B. 1. (discussing
why local control counts in some school desegregation opinions but not others).
237. See supra Part II.D.
238. See supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
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lines in determining the remedy, and paid little attention to the
involvement of the state defendants in maintaining segregated
Detroit schools.2"9 Further, Milliken II mandated that the school
desegregation remedy take into account the autonomy interests of
public school officials.240
As a result, courts have generally been quite deferential to
defendants in the school desegregation process. Certainly, some
exceptional cases demonstrate extensive judicial involvement,
particularly cases when the state is liable for the remedial costs.241
In the run-of-the-mill school desegregation lawsuit, however,
defendants' proposed remedies are almost always accepted.242 From
239. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 216 F.3d 720, 724, 727 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(reversing district court's sua sponte declaration of unitary status); Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d
313, 326 (1st Cir. 1987) (declaring Boston's public schools unitary with respect to student
assignment); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 123 F. Supp. 2d 694,723 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding continuing "vestiges of segregation"); Tasby v. Woolery, 869 F. Supp. 454, 477-78
(N.D. Tex. 1994) (approving three-year plan to deem Dallas Independent School District
unitary). The cases that seem to generate the most judicial opinions-e.g., Jenkins and
Yonkers-are the ones where the state is liable for part of the remedy. In those cases, the
defendant school district and state defendants often disagree about the scope of the remedy,
thereby necessitating judicial determination of which defendant deserves deference. See
supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Hull v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ., 1 F.3d 1450, 1451, 1456 (5th Cir.
1993) (allowing defendants to close partially integrated school); Harris v. Crenshaw County
Bd. of Educ., 968 F.2d 1090, 1091 (11th Cir. 1992) (upholding approval of defendant's plan
to consolidate a predominantly black high school with other schools); United States v.
Mississippi, 921 F.2d 604,605-06 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding district court order allowing the
consolidation of two school districts); Flax v. Potts, 864 F.2d 1157, 1158 (5th Cir. 1989)
(affirming district court's approval of defendant's proposed plan to eliminate desegregative
busing); Montgomery v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 854 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir.
1988) (rejecting challenge to defendant's "achievement grouping" practices); Adams v. Bd. of
Pub. Educ., 770 F.2d 1562,1563 (1lth Cir. 1985) (upholding approval of defendants' modified
desegregation plan which included closing predominantly African American elementary
schools); Andrews v. City of Monroe, 730 F.2d 1050, 1051 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming district
court's order approving defendant's proposed advanced placement program); Lee v. United
States, 914 F. Supp. 489, 496 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (approving the Tuscaloosa City Board of
Education's new construction plan); Lee v. Geneva County Bd. of Educ., 892 F. Supp. 1387,
1396 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (approving defendants' request to consolidate school districts); Arthur
v. Nyquist, 514 F. Supp. 1133, 1134, 1140-41 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (approving defendant's
remedial plan). But see Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 184, 184-85 (11th Cir.
1993) (en banc) (per curiam) (affirming by an equally divided court district court's refusal to
allow closure of racially integrated school); United States v. Pittman, 808 F.2d 385, 392 (5th
Cir. 1987) (reversing district court's approval of school desegregation plan which included the
conversion of two nearly all-black schools into magnet schools); Lee v. Chambers County Bd.
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1992 to 2002, for example, defendants' proposed remedies were
overwhelmingly approved, especially when the remedy concerned
243more than minor issues.
The deference to local school authorities has become a leading
remedial approach in part because the other factors for determining
the scope of the school desegregation remedy are highly indetermi-
nate. In addition to taking into account the interests of the state
and local defendants, the remedy is to place the plaintiffs in the
position they would have been but for the violation.2 44 Where any of
us would be absent de jure segregation is simply unknowable.245
Further, the standard requires that the scope of the violation shall
determine the scope of the remedy.24 The school desegregation
right is largely unknowable without reference to the remedy. In
fact, this "right-remedy test" is uniformly criticized for its inherent
ambiguity in public law cases.24' The only aspect of the test that has
of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 1474, 1475, 1503 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (rejecting request of city to operate
school district independent of county). For an analysis of district court opinions from June
1, 1992 to June 1, 2002 reaching this result, see Parker, supra note 214, at 1633-38.
243. See Parker, supra note 214, at 1629-34.
244. See supra note 180.
245. No one knows--not even social scientists studying the issue-the answer to that
question. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 503 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Racially
imbalanced schools are ... the product of a blend of public and private actions, and any
assessment that they would not be segregated, or would not be as segregated, in the absence
of a particular one of those factors is guesswork."); Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes
ofAffirmative Action, or School Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1101,
1111-16 (1996) (arguing that "the inability to disentangle the remote causes of the present
situation renders unworkable the traditional causal inquiries"); Ryan, supra note 234, at
1671-74 (demonstrating why social science evidence has very limited applicability in school
desegregation opinions).
246. See supra note 180.
247. This test is typically referred to as placing plaintiffs in their "rightful position," or as
the right-remedy connection-meaning that the right determines the remedy. See, e.g., Owen
M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, Foreword to The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1, 46-49 (1979) (characterizing the right-remedy as a test that "fundamentally misleads" and
"gives us an impoverished notion of remedy"); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter
Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 747 (1992) (arguing that the
right-remedy test is "vague and somewhat indeterminate ... [and] permit[s] courts to do
pretty much what they want"); John Leubsdorf, Completing the Desegregation Remedy, 57
B.U. L. REV. 39,83-85 (1977) (describing the test as "so trite that it is hard to see how it could
either enlighten or cause controversy); Nagel, supra note 215, at 715 (critiquing the right-
remedy connection as "indeterminate"); Parker, supra note 189, at 511-22 (critiquing the
right-remedy connection on causation grounds); Kent Roach, The Limits of Corrective Justice
and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional Remedies, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 859, 879 (1991)
(criticizing the right-remedy connection for its lack of honesty).
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meaning standing alone is deference to state and local government
defendants, thereby increasing its importance.24
At the end stage of school desegregation, unitary status, the
federal judiciary has not hesitated to dismiss school desegregation
suits in the name of local control. 49 One could argue that the
judiciary is only doing so in recognition of the successful work of the
defendants in eradicating the de jure system and any present day
disparities. The standard for unitary status, in fact, requires proof
of the elimination of the "vestiges of discrimination"--any remain-
ing racial disparities--"to the extent practicable" and to the extent
caused by the defendant's illegality.250
In all the unitary status cases recently decided by the Supreme
Court, racial disparities remained. 251 Thus, the question became
whether the defendants' actions caused the existing disparities.
Again, the issue begged the unknowable question of causation. To
what extent were continuing vestiges of discrimination defendants'
fault? This is the central question for unitary status, but one that
is an unanswerable one.
In deeming the defendants not responsible for the continuing
disparities, in answering this unanswerable question, the Supreme
Court has been more than willing to choose that the defendant is
248. Professor John Choon Yoo has recognized the prominence of the language of local
control, but has characterized the language as "nothing more than ... a concern." John Choon
Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal
Courts, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1121, 1133 (1996). He reasons that "[tihe Court does not appear to
have ever invalidated a structural remedy on the ground that it improperly intruded upon
the proper authority of state and local institutions." Id. He further explains his position as
follows: "If there is a core attribute of sovereignty into which federal courts cannot intrude,
the Supreme Court has yet to identify it." Id. at 1134. He argues that the Court imposed
limitations on the remedies in Jenkins III and Milliken I because "the remed[ies were] not
tailored to the constitutional violation." Id. at 1133 n.83. In doing so, Professor Yoo is
referencing the standard that the scope of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.
He admits, however, that this standard is essentially meaningless, as is uniformly
recognized. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. He, in fact, describes the standard
as "Delphic." Yoo, supra, at 1132; see also id. ('It is difficult, however, to see how an appellate
court can apply such an open-ended phrase in any principled, consistent manner. Whether
a remedy 'directly address[es] and relate[s] to' a violation often rests in the eye of the
beholder ...."). Limitations in Jenkins III and Milliken I, however, could not have been due
to a meaningless standard; instead, judicial perceptions and choices unrelated to the stated
standard better explain the results.
249. See supra Part II.D.
250. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,249-50 (1991).
251. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
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not at fault and excuse their responsibility for continuing dispari-
ties.252 With this choice, local control is completely restored. The
question of unitary status demands a judicial choice, and judicial
choice has reflected a strong judicial attitude that continuing
disparities are caused by matters beyond the defendants' control."3
The courts have decided, in other words, that our country would
still be segregated, even if defendants had never illegally segre-
gated. Private action is deemed the cause of the current segrega-
tion.
In short, local control has allowed defendants remarkable
authority in the remedial process."' Defendants were able to stall
the beginning of the desegregation process after Brown II,5 then
were effectively shut out of the remedial process with Green and
Swann,2" but were eventually invited back into remedial decision
making with Milliken I and Milliken 11.257 While parts of Milliken
II and Jenkins 11 promoted strong judicial enforcement values over
local authority, defendants generally have been granted remarkable
power in the remedial process. Finally, the recent school desegrega-
tion cases evidence a strong desire to restore complete local control
and to craft a right with almost no meaning.258
III. DEFERENCE AND LOCAL CONTROL
This Part compares affirmative action's notion of deference with
school desegregation's allowance of local control. At their core, both
are the same: an expansion of the role of state and local education
officials in defining the Equal Protection Clause's mandate over
schools, at the expense of the national judiciary's authority. 9 Both
are also easily manipulated to fit the desired outcome, and both
have the potential to result in rights that vary by school. 2" Thus,
252. See supra Part II.D.
253. Id.
254. Defendants' authority has also had a profound impact on the meaning of the right to
be free from de jure segregation. See infra notes 288-98 and accompanying text.
255. See supra Part II.A.
256. See supra Part II.B.
257. See supra Part II.C.
258. See supra Part II.D.
259. See infra notes 264-76 and accompanying text.
260. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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this Part argues that affirmative action's deference and school
desegregation's local control are similar enough that it is unfair to
characterize Justice O'Connor's approach in Grutter as "unprece-
dented,"261 even though differences between the two exist.262
Deference and local control are quite similar. First and most
importantly, both craft a role for educators in determining the
constitutionality of race-conscious activity. In school desegregation,
defendants can consider race if remedying past discrimination,
which has long been recognized as a compelling governmental
interest.263 School desegregation opinions, however, lack traditional
strict scrutiny analysis.2' To begin with, the narrow tailoring prong
is absent. School desegregation opinions omit both the language and
idea of narrow tailoring and the typical factors associated with it. 2
65
Instead, courts focus on one-half of the strict scrutiny analysis and
ask whether defendants' past discrimination caused the current
disparity.266 If this is true, then a compelling governmental interest
261. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text; see also supra note 78 (noting other
reasons why Grutter's approach is not novel).
262. See infra notes 284-97 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
264. The term "strict scrutiny" appears infrequently in school desegregation opinions. In
the three Supreme Court school desegregation opinions since 1990, for example, the phrase
.strict scrutiny" appears only in two sentences authored by Justice O'Connor in a concurring
opinion:
But it is not true that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact.J"
It is only by applying strict scrutiny that we can distinguish between
unconstitutional discrimination and narrowly tailored remedial programs that
legislatures may enact to further the compelling governmental interest in
redressing the effects of past discrimination.
Jenkins III, 515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)). The issue arose
in the context of discussing Justice Thomas' argument about restricting school desegregation
jurisdiction and limiting judicial authority. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 131-33
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that courts should exercisejudicial restraint and terminate
their jurisdiction with the pronouncement of the school desegregation remedy).
265. The narrow tailoring factors typically include the following:
(1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral policies, (2) the planned duration of
the policy, (3) the relationship between the numerical goal and the percentage
of minority group members in the relevant population or work force, (4) the
flexibility of the policy, including the provision of waivers if the goal cannot be
met, and (5) the burden of the policy on innocent third parties.
See Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality)).
266. This mode of inquiry was absent at the beginning of school desegregation, when the
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exists, and courts will conclude that race-conscious relief is
appropriate. As has been discussed previously,1 7 the necessary
causation inquiry is often pointless.216 Any answer to the question
is usually one based on non-causation grounds. One value continu-
ally stressed is respecting the tradition of local control over schools.
Courts have effectuated this value by deferring to school desegrega-
tion defendants in crafting and enforcing the remedy.269 Deference
was true at the beginning of school desegregation 270 and continues
today,271 although it has abated at times.272 As a result, defendants
have had a great deal of control over race-conscious activities
undertaken in the pursuit of desegregation.
In affirmative action plans, defendants can consider race in the
pursuit of diversity so long as the program is not a quota.273
Diversity itself gives defendants control over the constitutionality
of race-conscious activity. It is so amorphous a term that it permits
any number of race-conscious activities, as well as giving educators
a great deal of discretion in engaging in race-conscious activity.274
Further, the Court's decision affirming the law school's program
was explicitly deferential to the school officials. The principle of
critical question was not remedy, but whether defendants had unlawfully segregated. Once
the litigation turns to the question of remedy, this becomes the central question, particularly
as the time between the original violation and the remedy increases.
267. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
268. Courts have developed other tests for evaluating school desegregation remedies, but
the tests are exceptionally ambiguous. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
269. One recent study of school desegregation district court cases published between June
1, 1992 and June 1, 2002 found only one case in which a defendant's request for unitary
status was denied in part. See Parker, supra note 214, at 1633. For a small school district
outside of Pittsburgh, only partial unitary status was awarded, meaning only portions of the
school desegregation case were dismissed, instead of the full unitary status requested. See
supra note 214. On the question of remedy, the study found that defendants' requests were
overwhelmingly granted, especially when the request concerned more than minor
implementation issues. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
270. See supra Part II.A supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part II.D; supra notes 236-54 and accompanying text.
272. See supra Part II.B; supra notes 220-35 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part I. Justice Scalia and Professor Derrick Bell, among others, have
complained that the line between the law school's constitutional program and the
undergraduate school's unconstitutional one is too narrow. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.
Ct. 2325, 2349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bell, supra note
69, at 1622. Yet, the constitutionality of the law school's system provides ample room for
other merit-based systems to pursue diversity. See Parker, supra note 51.
274. See generally Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573 (2000).
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deference was crucial in the decision that diversity could be a
compelling governmental interest.275 The Supreme Court also
evidenced some degree of deference on the issue of narrow tailoring
in Grutter, although not in Gratz.
27 6
Second, not only do local control and deference both craft a role
for educators in deciding the constitutionality of race-conscious
activity, but the underlying rationales are likely similar as well.
Both competency and federalism validate local control in school
desegregation and deference in educational affirmative action.277 As
explored below, the federal judiciary has generally recognized the
superior competency of educators in the classroom setting, and
federalism usually supports nonfederal authority over public
schools.27' Both concepts counsel the judicial hesitation inherent in
school desegregation's local control and affirmative action's
deference.
Third, neither deference nor local control will solely determine
the outcome of litigation.279 Local control mattered at critical school
desegregation junctures, but not always.20 Further, deference may
have had a large role in Grutter,281' but the concept was not enough
to save Michigan's undergraduate program from being declared an
unconstitutional quota in Gratz.28 2 Instead, as explored in more
detail below, other values may trump deference and local control.8 3
In other words, school officials' authority will be questioned.
One striking difference exists between deference and local
control.2' Grutter crafted a role for educators on the legal question
275. See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
276. In Grutter, once the majority determined that the program was not a quota, then the
idea of narrow tailoring received little in-depth analysis. See supra notes 63-71 and
accompanying text. But in Gratz, the school officials were not able to prove the absence of
a quota. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2430-31 (2003).
277. See infra Part IV.A.
278. See infra Part IV.A.
279. See infra Part IV.B.1.
280. See supra Part II.E (summarizing the role of local control in school desegregation
jurisprudence).
281. See supra Part I.
282. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427-28 (2003).
283. See infra Part IV.B.
284. Differences between affirmative action and school desegregation exist as well. See
infra notes 336-44 and accompanying text. But the differences are irrelevant to comparing
deference to local control.
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of whether diversity could be a compelling governmental interest,2
which is a question primarily associated with rights. School
desegregation defendants, on the other hand, have had no input on
the legal question of whether remedying past discrimination could
be a compelling governmental interest. The notion of local control
instead has had a direct impact on the remedy. Thus, at first blush
the deference in Grutter appears to have had a large impact on
defining fundamental legal principles affecting rights, while local
control did not, instead affecting only the school desegregation
remedy.
Yet, this difference is largely insignificant for two reasons. First,
the legal question of whether diversity can be a compelling govern-
mental interest contains an element of educational policy-the
matter is presented as an idea impacting classroom learning. This
makes the deference of courts not entirely novel' and consistent
with general ideas about federal courts limiting their authority to
legal matters. Whether remedying past discrimination can be a
compelling governmental interest, however, has no interplay with
educational judgment, so it is not too surprising that local control
had no role in this legal determination. Granted, school districts at
one point defended the legality of de jure segregation by arguing
that racial segregation was an educational necessity.287 The
Supreme Court then rejected the rhetoric of educational necessity,
perhaps because this was only a small part of the justification and
it was obvious that the overall goal of de jure segregation was to
establish a caste system.
Second, in school desegregation the connection between right and
remedy is so exceptionally close that distinction between the two is
largely meaningless. Impacting the remedy will impact the right.
Legal realist Lon Fuller contended long ago that often the best way
to study legal rights is by examining the remedies to enforce those
rights.28 This is particularly true for school desegregation because
the right at issue is only knowable by reference to its remedies.28 9
285. See supra Part I.
286. See supra note 78.
287. See KLUGER, supra note 89, at 250.
288. See Lon L. Fuller, Williston on Contracts, 18 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 n.5 (1939) (book
review).
289. See infra notes 290-98 and accompanying text.
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For example, the right in Brown I was the right to be free from
public school assignments based on race, but the prohibition of the
consideration of race was only the first of many steps in ascertain-
ing what the right included.2  Critically, the Supreme Court in
Brown I did not resolve whether the right included more than an
end to student assignment based on race. 291' Eventually, the Court
declared that the right meant more than race-neutral alternatives
to race-based assignment. 92 The result came, however, from the
remedial decision in Green regarding whether a freedom-of-choice
plan was an adequate remedy.293
In this and other instances the right declared in Brown I
developed meaning largely through its remedies. 294 The decision in
Milliken I to respect school boundary lines is generally recognized
as allowing whites to flee to the suburbs to avoid desegregation
altogether, which in turn caused overwhelmingly minority school
districts to stay segregated."9 More recently, the unitary status
290. See supra Part II.A-B.
291. See WILKINSON, supra note 86, at 29 (listing the following questions as open to debate
after Brown I: "If segregated schools were not constitutional, what kinds of schools were?
Was the evil segregation itself or merely the state's imposition of it? Was a color-blind society
or the betterment of an oppressed race the Court's chief objective?"); Steven D. Smith, Brown
v. Board of Education- A Revised Opinion, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 41, 43 (1995) (recognizing in
rewriting Brown that "the notion of 'equal protection,' or of 'equality,' is a purely formal
concept empty of substantive content; not surprisingly, that concept might be embodied in
any number of different substantive doctrines"); Jordan Steiker, American Icon: Does It
Matter What the Court Said in Brown?, 81 TEX. L. REv. 305, 309 (2002) (noting that Brown
I left open "the hard question of whether compliance required an end to intentional
separation along racial lines or the establishment of non-racially identifiable schools")
(reviewing WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAvE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed.,
2001)).
292. See supra Part II.B.
293. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
294. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1293-94, 1298-1302 (1976) ("The form of relief does not flow ineluctably from the
liability determination, but is fashioned ad hoc."); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political
Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 50
(1979) ("Pronouncing [public law] rights, however, does nothing to illuminate the remedy.');
Fiss, supra note 247, at 47 (acknowledging only a loose connection between right and
remedy); Robert D. Goldstein, A Swanm Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger
Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1978) ("In public law litigation, there has been a
deepening bifurcation of the liability and remedy stages of the lawsuit, with the result that
once a right and violation have been found, the judge may exercise broad discretion to order
a wide range of innovative, experimental, and intrusive remedies.").
295. See supra notes 162-73, 238-39 and accompanying text.
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cases indicate a willingness to accept continued segregation without
any need for judicial oversight.29
In sum, no clear demarcation between right and remedy exists in
school desegregation; the two overlap almost completely.297 What it
means to be free from dejure segregation is defined by the remedy
for such an offense. The defendants' substantial role in defining the
remedy affected the right as well..2 " Thus, both affirmative action's
deference and school desegregation's local control have affected the
rights at issue.
IV. FEDERALISM LESSONS
Part IV addresses the normative claim of the dissenting Justices
in Grutter that deference should have no impact on a strict scrutiny
analysis.299 It argues that federalism ideals (of value for these
same Justices elsewhere) underlies in many respects the role of
local control, and, relatedly, deference."° Federalism's support,
however, comes at a very high price.3 ° I It can be easily manipulated
to reach a desired outcome, and the manipulation will have no
relation to federalism values. 0 2 This makes federalism's support
of any doctrine tenuous. Further, a federalism component in
Equal Protection jurisprudence means that different schools will
be allowed to offer different protections to their applicants and
296. See supra Part II.D; supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
297. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 913-14 (1999) ("Rlemedial equilibration emphasizes that rights and
remedies operate as part of a single package."); Doug Rendleman, Irreparability
Resurrected?: Does a Recalibrated Irreparable Injury Rule Threaten the Warren Court's
Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343, 1353 (2002) (advocating a
"fluid, contextual view of a court's characterizations" of remedies); Tracy A. Thomas,
Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 681-95, 747
(2001) (presenting a broad analysis of rights essentialism and advocating the unified right
theory).
298. See Friedman, supra note 247, at 747 (arguing that considering state and local
interests is "either ... a meaningless gesture to placate state and local officials or is invoked
to rob plaintiffs whose rights have been violated of an effective remedy"); Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., No Final Victories: The Incompleteness of Equity's Triumph in Federal Public Law, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 105, 114 (noting that public law litigation in general
is limited by the judiciary's "deference to state interests in the name of federalism").
299. See supra notes 2-4, 72-77 and accompanying text.
300. See infra Part IV.A.
301. See infra Part IV.B.
302. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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students."03 For if local education officials are to have an impact on
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, varying meanings of
the Equal Protection Clause will necessarily arise. That leaves
Equal Protection rights changing by locality, with the possibility
that some plaintiffs may have very weak constitutional protections.
While such an outcome is inconsistent with the common perception
of the Equal Protection Clause, school desegregation litigation
teaches that such an outcome is the best possible one given the
judiciary's limited competency in educational policy.304
A. Local Control and Federalism
This section explores the connection between local control and
federalism3 -the idea that over some matters the national
government is to have control, while other areas are reserved for
state and local governments.0 6 For to the extent federalism can
303. See infra Part IV.B.2.
304. See infra Part IV.B.3.
305. At issue here is the Supreme Court's treatment of state and local education officials
in its Equal Protection jurisprudence. Thus, not specifically at issue is the relationship
between Congress and the States, the more prominent part of the Supreme Court's
federalism revival. See generally Fallon, supra note 23, at 431 (concluding that the Supreme
Court has established 'Congress cannot compel the states to submit to private suits for
money damages even when they violate federal rights"); Sylvia A- Law, In the Name of
Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
367, 396 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court's "new limits on congressional power have
already had a seriously adverse impact, stripping individuals of liberty and equality rights
and other protections that have long been recognized by Congress").
306. This Article assumes that local governments are covered by federalism to the same
extent as state governments. See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 33, at 72 n.6 (noting that the
anticommandeering doctrines, which are based on federalism, protect both state and local
governments); Fallon, supra note 23, at 441 (concluding that "[a] jurisprudence of federalism
that ignores local governments would ... be functionally (even if not constitutionally)
incomplete"); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 n.5
(1994) (noting that federalism can concern the relationships between state and local
governments and the federal government, although his article addresses states and federal
governments); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1484-85 (1987) (including local governments as part of a historical and
normative analysis of federalism) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS'
DESIGN (1987)); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-7, 49 (1988) (including local
governments as part of the federalism analysis). For a summary of the Supreme Court's
inclusion of local governments in federalism, see Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?"
Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VANM. L. REv. 1303,1328-
35 (1994). For an argument that local governments should be distinguished from state
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justify local control, it may also justify the very similar approach of
deference.0 7
To determine whether local control is based on federalism, one
must start with defining federalism. The textual bases for federal-
ism3 08 provide little guidance on the actual meaning of federalism
as interpreted by the courts.30 9 Nor is any definition of federalism
universally accepted.1 0 Yet, considerable agreement on federal-
ism's underlying values exists.3n Academics may disagree on the
governments, see id. at 1335-49.
307. This section first analyzes local control, rather than deference, from the standpoint
of federalism because its almost fifty-year history, see supra Part I, allows more in-depth
analysis than the Court's very recent opinion in Grutter. See supra Part I.
308. At least five constitutional provisions are at play. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3
(protecting each state's territorial integrity); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing every
state "a Republican Form of Government"); U.S. CONST. art. V (protecting each state's equal
representation in the Senate); U.S. CONST. amend. X (retaining for the states and the people
all powers not delegated to the United States or prohibited to the states); U.S. CONST. amend.
XI (disallowing certain suits against states).
309. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (describing the Tenth
Amendment as "essentially a tautology"); Jackson, supra note 24, at 2215 (concluding that
"standards limiting national legislation in substantive matters claimed to be 'reserved' to the
states do not emerge clearly from the naked text of Congress's enumerated powers"); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993)
(discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion in New York v. United States); Edward L. Rubin &
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 928
(1994) (noting Justice O'Connor's functional approach to federalism). For an argument that
the language and history of the Guarantee Clause, U.S. CONST. art. V, § 4, "provides an
essential constitutional limit on federal interference with state autonomy," see Merritt,
supra note 306, at 22-36. For an argument that the First Amendment provides protections
to states, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1157, 1161-62 (1991).
310. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 439 ("There is no agreed-upon definition of
constitutional federalism.").
311. See id. at440 ("[INlearly all agree... that federalism serves important values."). Rubin
and Feeley have prominently argued that federalism is served by none of its underlying
values. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 309, at 910 (contending that the values of federalism
are achieved by the "managerial concept" of"decentralization"); see also Briffault, supra note
306, at 1327 (concluding that "federalism may not be necessary to promote the values it is
said to advance," yet recognizing the benefits of federalism often occur at the local level,
which he excludes from his definition of federalism). For responses to Rubin and Feeley, see
Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 380-405 (1997) (contending,
inter alia, that Rubin and Feeley's theory "begins from an unrealistic baseline" because their
idea of decentralization is so contrary to American history); Jackson, supra note 24, at 2218-
20 (arguing that "Rubin and Feeley's analysis also underestimates the value of states as
alternative locations of independently derived government power"); Daniel B. Rodriguez,
Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects of Interstate Regulatory Competition, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 149, 153 (1996) (responding by analyzing the "institutional structure found
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connection between state and local autonomy and actualization of
the values, 12 but the values underlying federalism provide the basis
of a commonly employed "functional analysis" to determine when it
is appropriate to assign authority to the states and local govern-
ments."' 3
Four values support the autonomy of states and localities: public
participation in democracy, prevention of tyranny, promotion of
experimentation, and allowance of shared communities. All apply
in the education setting. Public participation in democracy is the
first value for allowing state or local control over a matter.31'
in these fifty states" as central to notions of contemporary American federalism).
312. Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 433 (2002)
(arguing that liberals should embrace judicial enforcement of states' rights); Fallon,
supra note 23, at 430 (discussing Supreme Court cases decided on federalism grounds);
Jackson, supra note 24, at 2213 (discussing the scholarly literature on the federalism
revival).
313. For a discussion of the necessity of functional analysis, see Chemerinsky, supra note
33, at 534.
314. The Supreme Court recognized this reason in New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 169 (1992). In reaching its decision on the unconstitutionality of the Low Level Waste
Policy Act, the Court recognized that
where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state
officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials
who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the
views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.
Id.; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991) (noting that federalism "increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes"); Adler & Kreimer, supra note
33, at 81-82 ("It is a shibboleth of the literature endorsing federalism that states facilitate
a kind or degree of political participation by citizens that does not occur at the national
level."); Samuel Beer, Federalism, Nationalism and Democracy in America, 72 AM. POL. ScI.
REv. 9, 10 (1978); Fallon, supra note 23, at 440 ("[In comparison with the national
government, state and local governments are closer to the people and more capable of
reflecting local needs, values, and mores."); id. at 441 ("[Tlhere are more opportunities to
participate in government, and to do so efficaciously, at the local level."); Friedman, supra
note 311, at 390 (concluding that "[i]ntuition suggests that more people would and could
participate in smaller levels of government, and common experience seems to bear this out");
Jackson, supra note 24, at 2213 (identifying "increasing opportunities for political
participation" as one of the "potential benefits of federalism"); McConnell, supra note 306,
at 1509 (providing support among the Founders for the idea that "representatives in a
smaller unit of government will be closer to the people"); Merritt, supra note 306, at 7-8 ("The
greater accessibility and smaller scale of local government allows individuals to participate
actively in governmental decisionmaking."); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 395-408
(analyzing in detail the ideal of "providing a space for participatory politics"). Professor
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Because states and localities are smaller elected bodies than
national ones, individuals will have a greater voice in the decision-
making process, and the smaller elected bodies will be more
accountable. Another value counseling state or local authority is the
diffusion of power to protect liberty. As the Supreme Court has
noted, "the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on
abuses of government power.""' The conception of states and
localities as laboratories for experimentation is a third value in
evaluating state authority. 16 As smaller entities of government,
Deborah Jones Merritt identifies several benefits resulting from this participation: "lIlt
trains citizens in the techniques of democracy, fosters accountability among elected
representatives, and enhances voter confidence in the democratic process." Merritt, supra
note 306, at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
315. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997)
(concluding that "{tihis separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural
protections of liberty"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that "the Federal and State Governments ... hold each other in
check by competing for the affections of the people"); New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (reasoning
that "a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front") (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458); Adler
& Kreimer, supra note 33, at 79-80 (arguing that "tyranny prevention' ... has figured most
prominently in the recent case law"); Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 525 (contending that
"the Framers saw the separation of powers horizontally, among the branches of the federal
government, and vertically, between the federal and state governments, as the best
safeguard against autocratic rule"); Fallon, supra note 23, at 441 (recognizing that "state and
local governments function as counterweights to national power"); Friedman, supra note 311,
at 402-04 (concluding that "the states serve as an independent means of calling forth the
voice of the people, if and when this is necessary"); Jackson, supra note 24, at 2214, 2218-20
(recognizing "maintaining the possibility of checks on oppression by the federal government"
as a reason for state authority); McConnell, supra note 306, at 1500 (discussing support
among the Founders to the idea that "state and local governments are better protectors of
liberty"); Merritt, supra note 306, at 3-7 (discussing Madison's and Hamiltoen's justification
for federalism on the grounds of checking abuses of governmental power); Rapaczynski,
supra note 314, at 380-95 (deeming the prevention of tyranny as "[plerhaps the most
frequently mentioned function of the federal system").
316. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that "[sitates
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where
the best solution is far from clear"); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (arguing that federalism "allows
for more innovation and experimentation in government"); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742,787-88 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part) ("ITihe Court's decision undermines the
most valuable aspects of our federalism. Courts and commentators frequently have
recognized that the 50 States serve as laboratories for the development of new social,
economic, and political ideas."); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505-06 (1957) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) ("It has often been said that one of the great strengths of our federal system
is that we have, in the forty-eight States, forty-eight experimental social laboratories."); New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (reasoning that
"lilt is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
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states and localities can experiment with different approaches to
maximize the opportunities for success. Lastly, and closely related
to the value of promoting states as laboratories for experimentation,
is the value of creating communities of shared interests.317 Allowing
experimentation at the state and local level will also allow cultural
and local diversity that can benefit any number of viewpoints.1 8
Through the creation of communities of shared interests, people can
choose to live in these communities. This allows maximizimation of
choice and utility through competition and exit.31 9
To determine whether a matter properly falls within the power
of the national government, one typically determines first whether
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country"); SHAPIRo, supra note 27, at 87-88 (finding notable
examples of the benefits of state experimentation); Adler & Kreimer, supra note 33, at 78-79
("[I]t makes sense to create a mechanism by which to test novel policies on a subnational
scale."); Fallon, supra note 23, at 440 (contending that "diversity of state and local
governments permits experiment and competition"); Friedman, supra note 311, at 397-400
(arguing that the idea of experimentation is really better captured by the phrase of
"innovation as an evolutionary process"); Jackson, supra note 24, at 2214 (including
"providing opportunities for experiment and beneficial innovation" as a reason for
federalism); McConnell, supra note 306, at 1498 (discussing support for the proposition that
"state and local governmental units will have greater opportunity and incentive to pioneer
useful changes"); Merritt, supra note 306, at 9 (stating that "[sitate governments repeatedly
have proved the truth of this statement by pioneering new social and economic programs").
317. See Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 536 ("Safeguarding community decisionmaking
enhances diversity, as groups are allowed to decide their own nature and composition.
Communities can define themselves to best serve the needs of their members."); Fallon,
supra note 23, at 440 ("[Flederalism fosters connection and community."); Friedman, supra
note 311, at 389-94 (noting that public participation at the local level discourages elitism);
Jackson, supra note 24, at 2213-14 (listing "maintaining opportunities for creation or
preservation of diverse cultures" as a reason for state autonomy); Merritt, supra note 306,
at 8-9 ("Acting through their state and local governments, citizens in each region create the
type of social and political climate they prefer."). For an argument that the same result could
still be achieved by a national government, see Arthur Macmahon, The Problems of
Federalism: A Survey, in FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 11 (Arthur Macmahon ed.,
1962). Jackson distinguishes this value as follows: "The theme of preserving diversity could
be viewed as subsumed in the preference maximizing' possibilities of local competition and
exit, but captures more the possibility of group culture and the capacity of legal institutions
to form preferences as well as to satisfy existing preferences.' Jackson, supra note 24, at
2214 n.156.
318. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 ("This federalist structure ... assures a decentralized
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society ....").
319. See id.; Adler & Kreimer, supra note 33, at 78 ("[I1f separate governments defined by
geographic region exist, then citizens will migrate to different regions depending on, say,
their needs, interests, or ethical views ...."); McConnell, supra note 306, at 1503 (describing
the idea of "[l]iberty through mobility").
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the states should have control. If that question is answered with a
"no," then the matter is thought to be properly within the national
power. Professor Barry Friedman, however, has properly noted that
such an inquiry is only "half of the story about valuing federal-
ism."32 ° He cites four separate values for evaluating the need for
national authority, all of which often arise in analyses of the values
for evaluating the need for state or local authority, but only one of
which is applicable to national authority over public schools.821 That
is, when uniformity is needed, national power is necessary. 322
At one level, asking whether federalism is the reason for allowing
local control in school desegregation jurisprudence is troublesome.
The Court has, at times, emphasized the need for local control on
grounds traditionally associated with federalism.'" On another
320. Friedman, supra note 311, at 405.
321. The three other values are commonly described as public goods, externalities, and
race to the bottom. See id. at 405-09. The national government, for example, has authority
over public goods such as the military, interstate highways, and lighthouses because states
lack incentives to fund such costly measures. See SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 39-40 (providing
the examples of lighthouses and nuclear deterrent); Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Steadying the Court's 'Unsteady Path" A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1469 (1995) ("The most obvious role for the national government is
to provide public goods that the states are unlikely to provide through ordinary cooperation:
a unified foreign policy, the interstate highway system, and the hydrogen bomb."); Friedman,
supra note 311, at 406 ("Public goods are those that would not be provided if it were not for
the existence of some central authority to fund them."). Environmental laws are the common
example ofexternalities, which is the idea that weak environmental laws may entail no harm
within the state, but will export high costs outside the state. See SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at
40-41 (giving the examples of environmental laws and corporate governance). The race to the
bottom concept is closely related to that of externalities. National authority is needed when
states will benefit from offering the weakest level of protection, which can occur with labor
and employment laws. See Friedman, supra note 311, at 408 ("The theory of the race to the
bottom is that in enacting otherwise sensible regulations, states may disadvantage
themselves by raising the cost of doing business in the state, thus driving the business to
states that regulate less rigorously."); see also Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental
Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274
(1997) (examining empirical evidence on environmental law's race to the bottom). These
three values-public goods, externalities, and race to the bottom-are rarely implicated by
public schools. After all, public schools provide benefits to individual communities, and the
benefits usually provide adequate incentives for local and state support. No externalities
exist that would support national authority. To the extent that a state or locality decides not
to support education, then the costs are borne by that state or locality. Thus, no race to the
bottom with respect to education is likely to occur.
322. See SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 44-49 (outlining economic arguments in favor of
centralized government); Friedman, supra note 311, at 408-09 (noting that a need for
uniformity may necessitate national, as apposed to local, power).
323. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
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level, however, the Court could be employing federalist rhetoric
to reach a desired result. In addition, guessing why the judiciary
reaches a particular result surely cannot be reduced to a single
concept.
Yet, one cannot disconnect the idea of local control from federal-
ism. Local control, at its core, prefers state and local authority over
federal intervention; and this approach is, by definition, federalism
at work. In addition, the American history of education rests on a
solid foundation of "local control" of schools.32 Schools are typically
governed not by the national government, but by state and, par-
ticularly for primary and secondary schools, local governments.325
Granted, public schools are not operated entirely independently of
the national government, but local and state governance still
predominates in theory and practice.326
324. See generally Charles F. Faber, Is Local Control of the Schools Still a Viable Option?,
14 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POLY 447,447-49 (1991) (providing a historical account of local control).
325. Some schools even experimented with "community control," with mixed results. See
Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal Intervention in Bilingual Education, 76
CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1334 n.368 (1988) (discussing the community control movement). Local
control over primary and secondary education is also fundamentally constrained by many
state laws. This includes attendance laws, curriculum standards, approved textbook lists,
teacher certification rules, diploma standards, financing formulas, and accountability
measures such as high-stakes tests. See generally Faber, supra note 324, at 449-50, 456
(discussing the prevalence of such laws and concluding that "there has been an increase in
both state and national control of our schools, and a corresponding decrease in local control,
during the past forty years"); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249,
266-72 (1999) (reviewing school finance litigation); James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in
School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 457-71 (1999) (analyzing legislative responses
to school finance litigation). Even charter schools, which are designed to avoid state
regulations, must comply with a wide variety of state rules. See generally Parker, supra note
44, at 574-81 (discussing many ofthe legal rules imposed on charter schools). For an analysis
of how best to protect local governments from state governments, see Daniel B. Rodriguez,
Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2001).
326. For example, substantial federal money supports public schools, and obligations
attach to this money. Beginning with the Civil War, the federal government has offered
federal monies in exchange for implementing specified federal policy. Thus, at the higher
education level, after the Civil War, federal legislation funded engineering and agricultural
programs at public colleges and the establishment of "Negro" colleges. See ORFIELD, supra
note 89, at 10; Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity by the Numbers: The Warren
Court's Empirical Legacy, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1309, 1316 (2002). Prominent federal
funding of programs at primary and secondary schools includes the federal school lunch
program, Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769 (2000), the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-3386 (2000),
which helps fund poor schools, and the Head Start program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9852 (2000).
The national government has also established educational policy more directly, particularly
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Three of the four values associated with state and local author-
ity support school desegregation's allowance of local control over
the remedial process. First, the value of public participation in
democracy is furthered by state and local power over desegregating
schools. If the alternative is authority by non-elected, life-tenured
judges, then the opportunity for participation will only exist within
the confines of party participation in litigation. Affording authority
to officials in the state and local executive and legislative
branches will further democratic ideals by increasing the number
of voices heard in the remedial process and by holding the decision
makers accountable through any attending electoral process.
Second, promoting state and local officials' authority will decrease
the chances for tyranny because the checks on the abuses ofjudicial
power-appellate review and impeachment-are significantly
weaker than that afforded by the electoral process.
Third, local control furthers experimentation in school desegrega-
tion more than exclusive judicial control. Given educators' superior
knowledge of education, promoting local control has the strong
possibility of increasing experimentation. While judges could
certainly draw upon the educators' knowledge in any number of
ways, imagining judges taking responsibility for educational
innovation in school desegregation is difficult. Educators, on the
other hand, likely would have the necessary confidence and
incentive to undertake experimentation. Further, because school
desegregation will vary by locality-local conditions will affect every
aspect of school desegregation-then experimentation is of high
value and a national standard is of low value. In sum, not only is
school desegregation's promotion of local control faithful to the
through the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1491 (2000), and
Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000). No national curriculum or national high-stakes tests
exist. The National Assessment of Education Progress tests, given for math, reading, and
science, in the fourth, eighth, and twelfth grades, are voluntary and are used only for
research purposes. See Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of Disparate
Impact Theory to Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1111, 1122 n.31
(2002). Yet, school districts are now required to improve their outcomes on state-selected
tests or face severe penalties under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, now part of ESEA.
See Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
20 U.S.C.). Some schools are claiming that the Act will result in a national curriculum,
particularly in reading. See Kathleen Kennedy Manzo & David J. Hoff, Federal Influence
Over Curriculum Exhibits Growth, EDUC. WI., Feb. 5, 2003, at 1, 10.
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American tradition of school governance, but it is consistent with
three values supporting state and local authority.
Left open is the impact of the fourth value associated with state
and local authority-creating communities of shared interest-and
the value supporting federal authority over schools--establishing
a national standard. The two are obviously related. When is it
acceptable for Americans to form their own unique communities, or
when must they live by the same standard? Federalism itself
provides no answer to these two questions, for they relate not to
who should be the decision maker but what should be the available
decisions. The questions depend on policy unrelated to federalism.
For example, Brown I established a national standard because
the Court had determined that the Equal Protection Clause must
outlaw dejure segregation.327 Green and Swann evidenced ajudicial
conclusion that the local experimentation with remedying school
desegregation had gone astray because of the continued segrega-
tion.3" Only then was a national rule again necessary. None of
these cases asserted a need to usurp state and local authority in
every instance, but only when the Equal Protection Clause required
a uniform standard. Thus, the national rule in Brown I was the end
to de jure segregation, and the national value in Green and Swann
was the end to continued segregation. These Equal Protection
Clause values, unrelated to federalism, were enough to overcome
the American tradition of local control.
Despite these exceptions, however, federalism provides a solid
foundation for the promotion of local control in school desegrega-
tion. When a uniform standard is necessary, the national judiciary
will assert its authority. More typically, the values supporting state
and local authority are found in the school desegregation setting.
Many will resist making a connection between school desegrega-
tion and federalism. After all, school desegregation at its core
rejected a state's right to choose a school system that segregates;129
and the substantive right at issue, the Equal Protection Clause, is
a prohibition aimed at states.3 0 Yet, the idea and implementation
327. See supra Part II.A.
328. See supra Part II.B.
329. See generally Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
330. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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of local control are too closely aligned to the theory of federalism to
make any other conclusion. Close national oversight of local schools
is too antithetical to the American tradition of school governance,
even if that tradition is far from complete today,33' to isolate the
idea of local control from federalism.
To the extent federalism justifies local control, federalism
should support Grutter's idea of deference. The similarities in
outcome-federal courts crafting state and local authority when
educational policy is challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause 32 -equally support the three values associated with state
and local authority. 3 When the choice is between federal court
oversight and local or state authority over public schools, then the
latter is clearly more consistent with promoting public participation
in democracy, preventing tyranny, and encouraging experimenta-
tion. Further, in both affirmative action and school desegregation,
federalism itself leaves unanswered when a uniform standard is
needed and deference should be disregarded. For example, in Gratz,
the Court declared the University of Michigan undergraduate
admissions program unconstitutional on grounds independent of
federalism.3 4
While affirmative action and school desegregation are very
similar,3 '5 differences exist, and these differences may indicate that
331. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 263-76 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 314-19, 324-28 and accompanying text.
334. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427-28 (2003) (holding that a policy giving
an advantage to every underrepresented minority applicant to the College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts was a quota and thus not narrowly tailored).
335. Affirmative action and school desegregation share fundamental similarities. Both
involve public schools and the Equal Protection Clause, and both concern exceptions to the
Equal Protection Clause's prohibition against racial classification of students. School
desegregation remedies involve the exception of remedying past discrimination. See supra
Part III. Affirmative action plans are defended on diversity grounds. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text. Thus, the two are attempting to use race in ways allowed by the Equal
Protection Clause. Furthermore, because both forms of litigation have been filed against
public schools, they raise federalism concerns because a federal court is potentially
overruling the preferences of state and local governments. Finally, the two concern public
K-12 schools and higher education governed by state and local governments. While school
desegregation has focused on primary and secondary education, public colleges and
universities have also been subject to desegregation orders. See, e.g., United States v.
Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 729 (1992) (holding inadequate the remedy for Mississippi's higher
education system); Knightv. Alabama, 900 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (outlining remedial
order for Alabama higher education desegregation lawsuit); Settlement Agreement, Ayers
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federalism should apply to school desegregation, but not to affirma-
tive action. If this were so, then Grutter's use of deference could not
be justified on the grounds of federalism, although local control in
school desegregation could be supported by federalism.
Two primary differences exist between affirmative action and
school desegregation, and both concern the scope of the remedy.
First, school desegregation litigation since the 1960s has almost
always been either certified as a class action or treated as a class
action. Thus, any relief will have system-wide implications and will
not be confined to an individual student. By contrast, some, but
not all, affirmative action cases were filed as individual siiits.
3 16
Yet, even individual suits have system-wide implications. In
reaching the merits of a claim that a student was unlawfully denied
admission based on her race or ethnicity, the court will necessarily
have to determine the constitutionality of the entire program.
The remedy may concern whether an individual should attend a
particular school, but the remedy will not end there. A ruling on the
constitutionality of the challenged program will have system-wide
effects because that program will have to be changed not just for
the individual plaintiffs, but for everyone. That some affirmative
action cases are litigated as individual suits should not diminish
the potential reach of any injunction or declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the program, nor the opportunities for intruding
upon state and local authority.
Further procedural posture did not change federalism's role in
school desegregation. In the late 1950s, most school desegregation
v. Musgrove (N.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2001) (No. 4:75 CV9-B-D) (settlement agreement for
desegregation of Mississippi's public colleges and universities), available at
http://www.msnd.uscourts. gov/ayerssa.pdf; Consent Decree, Geierv. Sundquist (M.D. Tenn.
Jan. 4, 2001) (Civil Action No. 5077) (consent decree for desegregation of Tennessee's public
colleges and universities), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/edo/documents/geiersettle.
htm. Likewise, affirmative action challenges have been filed against both K-12 and higher
education. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001); Eisenberg v.
Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 126-27 (4th Cir. 1999); Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
336. For suits filed by individual students, see, for example, Brewer v. West Irondequoit
Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 2000); Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 125; Comfort v.
Lynn Sch. Comm., 150 F. Supp. 2d 285, 288 (D. Mass. 2001). For suits filed by multiple
students, see, for example, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2002), affd, 123




lawsuits were limited to individual claims because of procedural
limitations in the pupil enrollment acts passed after Brown H."'
The suits, for the most part, solely concerned the application of the
race-neutral statutes to individual students and had limited
potential for a system-wide impact. 38 Yet, federalism still had a
significant impact in post-Brown II litigation. 39 The difference in
procedural posture in some affirmative action cases, therefore,
should not affect the applicability of federalism.
Second, perhaps the best reason why federalism should apply to
school desegregation, but not to affirmative action, is the broad
scope of the school desegregation remedy and the resulting im-
pact on federalism values. In dismantling de jure segregation, the
judiciary involves itself in all facets of school administration. 31° This
strongly suggests a need for sensitivity to matters of local control
so that in the name of imposing a uniform standard courts do not
completely eradicate public participation in democracy, the
opportunity for experimentation, and protection from tyranny. In
addition, jurisdiction continues throughout the desegregation
process,34' increasing the opportunities for treading on the values
supporting local control. Thus, while the Equal Protection Clause
may compel a national standard for school desegregation, in
implementing that standard courts may need to, as much as
possible, preserve the values supporting state and local control. In
affirmative action cases, on the other hand, the remedy is relatively
contained. Only admission practices are subject to court order, and
judicial involvement in implementing the remedy is relatively brief.
Yet limiting federalism to school desegregation because of the
scope of its remedy ultimately proves unsatisfactory. First, it fails
to explain the inconsistent use of federalism within school desegre-
gation. Green and Swann were very intrusive on state and local
authority over schools; yet federalism values received only lip
service. 3 2 By contrast, the remedies sought immediately afterBrown II only involved the admission of individual children, like
337. See Note, supra note 93, at 1457; supra notes 93-94, 98-99 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
339. See supra Part II.C-E.
340. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
341. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955).
342. See supra Part II.B; supra notes 220-35 and accompanying text.
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current affirmative action litigation, 4 ' but federalism received a
great deal of attention.'" Second, even though school desegregation
remedies reach many facets of schooling, affin-mative action
remedies have similar potential. Now that diversity can be an
adequate justification for race-conscious admissions programs, a
strong possibility exists for diversity to extend to other aspects of
school administration, including scholarships and hiring. This
raises the possibility of further litigation.
Third, even if affirmative action presents fewer opportunities for
federal courts to trample on state and local autonomy than school
desegregation, those opportunities still exist. The number of
opportunities should not affect the need to respect state and local
authority, only the nature of the opportunities should. And the
nature of the opportunities in school desegregation shares much in
common with the opportunities in affirmative action that make
federalism applicable. In both, a federal court is involving itself in
educational policy at a public school, a matter traditionally outside
a court's authority.
In sum, the difference in the scope of the affirmative action
remedy and school desegregation remedy cannot adequately
explain why federalism would apply in school desegregation but not
affirmative action. To the extent values indicate state and local
authority-promoting public participation in democracy, allowing
experimentation, and preventing tyranny--the values should have
equal applicability to all Equal Protection Clause challenges to
public schools. No meaningful difference between affirmative action
and school desegregation exists with respect to the values of state
and local authority.
It is too soon to evaluate definitively whether deference will also
become part of the "quiet fronts" of federalism," as has been true
for school desegregation, but Grutter's idea of deference may have
some staying power. In other substantive areas, the Court has also
evidenced respect for state and local governmental officials,"
including police misconduct and prison cases.. 7 and voting rights
343. See supra notes 115-18, 336.
344. See supra Part II.A supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 78 (noting other special constitutional rules for schools).
347. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,352 (1981) ("[Clourts cannot assume that state
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litigation.148 Thus, Grutter's deference analysis may become one
legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to
the perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function in
the criminal justice system ...."); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976) ("[Alppropriate
consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and
scope ofequitable relief."); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,404-05 (1974) ("[Wlhere state
penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the
appropriate prison authorities."), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401 (1989).
348. In seven voting rights cases, the Court recently evaluated the constitutionality of
majority-minority voting districts devised by state legislatures. See, e.g., Easleyv. Cromartie,
532 U.S. 234 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S.
74 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) [hereinafter
Shaw I]; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). The majority
and dissenting opinions in these cases largely agreed that state legislatures should have
some degree of discretion in devising districting lines. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 977 (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion) ("We also reaffirm that the 'narrow tailoring' requirement of strict
scrutiny allows the States a limited degree of leeway in furthering such interests."); id. at
992 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In addition, fundamental concerns of federalism mandate
that States be given some leeway so that they are not 'trapped between the competing
hazards of liability.') (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)); Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 917 n.9 ("States retain broad discretion in
drawing districts to comply with the mandate of § 2."); Miller, 515 U.S. at 915 ("Electoral
districting is a most difficult subject for legislatures, and so the States must have discretion
to exercise the political judgment necessary to balance competing interests."); id. at 934-35
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[Wie agree that federalism and the slim judicial competence to
draw district lines weigh heavily against judicial intervention in apportionment decisions;
as a rule, the task should remain within the domain of state legislatures.").
Members of the Court have, however, disagreed on whether the majority actually afforded
any discretion to the state legislatures. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 1036-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("In light of this Court's recent work extolling the importance of state sovereignty in our
federal scheme ... I would have expected the Court's sensibilities to steer a course rather
more deferential to the States than the one that it charts with its decisions today."); Shaw
1/, 517 U.S. at 949-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court has fashioned ... a pure judicial
invention that unfairly deprives the legislature of a sovereign State of its traditional
discretion in determining the boundaries of its electoral districts.... Such a proposition
confounds basic principles of federalism ....") (footnote omitted). After all, the Court held
unconstitutional the challenged districts in all but one case. See Easley, 532 U.S. at 237
(holding that the district court was clearly erroneous in concluding that race was a
predominant factor in devising the district and that strict scrutiny therefore was not
applicable).
Voting rights defendants also have the right to propose first a remedy to any
unconstitutional voting practice, and that remedy must be accepted if it is constitutional. See
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1973) ("In fashioning a reapportionment plan or in
choosing among plans, a district court should not pre-empt the legislative task nor 'intrude
upon state policy any more than necessary.') (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124,160
(1971)); Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409-10 (1965) (per curiam) (holding that federal
district courts should defer to state courts and state legislatures before drafting their own
apportionment plans); Scranton v. Drew, 379 U.S. 40, 41-42 (1964) (per curiam) (vacating
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constant and forceful enough to be an example of federalism. In the
meantime one can evaluate whether deference should impact
affirmative action jurisprudence by exploring what local control, a
related concept, has meant for school desegregation jurisprudence.
B. Desegregation's Lessons for Affirmative Action
School desegregation litigation provides almost fifty years worth
of lessons on interjecting federalist principles into the Equal
Protection Clause. Given the similarities between local control and
deference,3 49 school desegregation is an excellent vehicle for
evaluating, from the standpoint of federalism, the claim of the
dissenting Justices in Grutter that deference is a dangerous
approach to strict scrutiny.5 0 School desegregation evidences two
strong reasons to limit the impact of federalism on the Equal
Protection Clause: (1) federalism is easy to manipulate to reach a
desired result, and (2) substantive rights end up varying by locality.
Yet, school desegregation ultimately evidences strong structural
support for Grutter's idea of deference. The judiciary's limited
competency in academic affairs, which includes most race-conscious
programs based on diversity, substantiates promoting deference.
1. Flexibility
School desegregation first teaches affirmative action that the
importance of federalism will fluctuate over time for reasons
unrelated to federalism. The idea of local control mattered in school
desegregation jurisprudence, but it had no impact at critical points
when the judiciary adopted a national standard.351 As discussed
previously, local control was of no importance when the judiciary
believed that states should not be able to choose to segregate
students by their race (Brown I),'52 that actual integration should
district court judgment in light of deference to state legislature's attempts to correct
reapportionment plan); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,586 (1964) ("IJiudicial relief becomes
appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional
requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.").
349. See supra Part III.
350. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
351. See supra Part II.E.
352. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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result when de jure segregation ends (Green and Swann),353 and
that the judiciary should have strong enforcement powers (Milliken
11, Jenkins i/).114 The same fluidity likely will be true with the role
of deference in affirmative actionjurisprudence. After all, deference
had great force in Grutter, but could not overcome the majority's
conclusion in Gratz that the program was a quota and therefore
unconstitutional. 355
The contrast appears in other education cases as well. In Sweatt
v. Painter356 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher
Education,357 two higher education desegregation cases decided
before Brown I, the Court held two graduate programs unconstitu-
tional for their failure to be "separate and equal" and had no
concern for local control, but had much to say about how the Court
believed education occurs.358 Yet, in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, the Court rejected a constitutional
challenge to the State of Texas' K-12 school financing system and
emphasized the importance of local control at length.359
353. See supra Part II.B.
354. See supra notes 173-200, 236 and accompanying text.
355. See supra Part I. Relatedly, the idea of deference to administrators had no impact in
the opinion holding Virginia's all-male military college, Virginia Military Institute,
unconstitutional. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). The Court gave no
credence to the defendants' arguments that admittance of women would destroy the very
foundation of the education offered. Id. at 534-39.
356. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
357. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
358. In Sweatt, the opinion ordered the admittance of Herman Marion Sweatt, who had
been denied admission to the University of Texas School of Law solely because of his race,
and at no point discussed local control or federalism. See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631, 636. The
same was true in McLaurin, where the Court ordered equal treatment of G.W. McLaurin in
the University of Oklahoma Graduate School. See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641-42. For an
analysis of the Court's decision in Sweatt, see Heise, supra note 326, at 1314. Heise noted
that in Sweatt:
[d]elving to a level of nuance informed by the Justices' fist-hand knowledge of
and experience with law schools and legal education, as well as exceptionally
detailed amicus briefs, the Court's level and rigor of scrutiny rendered the
Plessy doctrine little more than a feeble shell, at least as it applied to higher
education.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Heise continued that, "[t]he McLaurin opinion acknowledged that a
truly broad educational experience involves much more than the bricks-and-mortar issues
associated with physical facilities. Rather, the Court noted that critical educational benefits
flow from the free and unfettered exchange of ideas and interaction among students." Id. at
1315 (footnotes omitted).
359. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) ("[A]ppellees would
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Relatedly, the dissenting justices in Grutter-Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas-have advo-
cated limiting the judiciary's intervention in school desegregation
because it interfered with local control over schools.360 Yet, in the
affirmative action arena these four Justices have attempted to
curtail that local control by arguing that school officials deserve no
deference in their race-conscious admissions programs.361 Yet,
Grutter's use of deference and school desegregation's promotion of
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state
legislatures."); id. at 42 ("[Tlhis case also involves the most persistent and difficult questions
of educational policy, another area in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and
experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at
the state and local levels."); id. at 43 ("In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised
to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could
circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even
partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing
conditions.").
360. The Supreme Court has decided three school desegregation cases since 1990, and the
dissenting Justices in Grutter were in the majority in all three. See Jenkins 111, 515 U.S. 70,
72 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., with Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., majority
opinion); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,470 (1992) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and White, Scalia, and Souter, JJ., majority opinion, with Thomas, J., taking no part in the
case); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 239 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., majority opinion, with Souter, J., taking no part in the
case). All three opinions emphasize the importance of local control and limiting judicial
involvement in local schools. See supra Part II.D.
Two Justices advocated limited judicial intervention in school desegregation litigation in
concurring opinions in Jenkins III. Justice Thomas argued that jurisdiction should end with
the pronouncement of the school desegregation remedy because continued jurisdiction
"inject[s] the judiciary into the day-to-day management of institutions and local policies-a
function that lies outside of our Article III competence." Jenkins II, 515 U.S. at 135
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 392 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that the injunction requiring system-wide changes at Arizona prisons
"subjected the entire system to the requirements of the decree and to ongoing federal
supervision"); Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 131 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Federal courts do not
possess the capabilities of state and local governments in addressing difficult educational
problems."). Justice Thomas ended his opinion in Jenkins III as follows: "At some point, we
must recognize that the judiciary is not omniscient, and that all problems do not require a
remedy of constitutional proportions." Id. at 138 (Thomas, J., concurring).
361. Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas would limit the
available choices to educators by not allowing diversity to ever be a compelling governmental
interest. See supra note 72. This argument restricts local control, but the conclusion is
entirely consistent with possible interpretations of federalism. That is, the federal judiciary
has primary responsibility for interpreting the U.S. Constitution, see supra note 216 and
accompanying text, and disallowing diversity as a compelling governmental interest can be
defined as solely a question of legal interpretation.
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local control share much in common. The value of consistency,
which the Supreme Court has strongly advocated of late in its
Equal Protection jurisprudence, 62 would counsel support of both
deference and local control. 3
Standing alone, federalist principles are rarely determinative
because the judiciary can determine that the nonfederal approach
is unlawful (a decision usually based solely on Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence), resulting in federal intervention.364 State
and local control will receive minor respect, if at all, once this
decision is reached. 65 School desegregation's experience with local
control thus indicates that federalism can be manipulated to reach
a desired result.
2. Varying Rights
School desegregation also teaches that interjecting federalist
concerns into Equal Protection jurisprudence likely will result in
rights varying by locality. That is, by allowing defendants in school
desegregation to have strong control over the remedial process and
by potentially affording defendants in affirmative action litigation
deference in their racial programs, different students will be offered
362. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
majority opinion) (concluding that the Court "ha[s] established three general propositions
with respect to governmental racial classifications": skepticism, consistency, and
congruence). The Court has insisted on consistency in its Equal Protection jurisprudence on
a number of fronts. Thus, "benign" discrimination is judged by the same "fatal in fact" strict
scrutiny standard as invidious discrimination. See id. at 225-26; City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White
and Kennedy, JJ., plurality opinion); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring). Congress is subject
to strict scrutiny, as are states and localities when passing race-conscious public contracting
legislation. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, 227. Further, constitutional challenges to the
construction of voting districts are all judged by strict scrutiny, regardless of whether the
district is majority white or majority minority. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 650-51 (1993).
363. Justice O'Connor, in fact, has been largely consistent. In both affirmative action and
school desegregation, she has counseled a limit to judicial intervention. See, e.g., Jenkins III,
515 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Those myriad factors are not readily corrected
by judicial intervention, but are best addressed by the representative branches; time and
again, we have recognized the ample authority legislatures possess to combat racial injustice
.... "); supra notes 40-71 and accompanying text (detailing Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Grutter).
364. See supra Part IV.A
365. See supra Part IV.A.
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366different programs. This result is directly related to one federal-
ism justification for interjecting deference and local control in Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence-the need for promoting experi-
mentation.6 7
For example, in some schools undergoing desegregation, the
defendants have proposed extensive compensatory education
programs which the judiciary has approved, s  while other school
districts proposed no or only minor compensatory education
programs and no court order compelled such programs. 69 Imagining
that the effects of dejure segregation on education are so different
as to justify opposite remedial approaches is hard. Surely, the vast
majority of experiences with dejure segregation, if not all, impacted
learning; yet, some remedies pay only minor attention to such
concerns. The difference in remedy afforded to students-whether
pursuant to court order they ride a bus, have transfer choices,
attend a reading program, or have specially trained teachers-is
more directly tied to which particular programs are supported
by the defendants (and less typically by the judge) than to the
particular effects of de jure segregation. De jure segregation
certainly has different contours in different parts of the country and
may vary from rural to urban school settings. The great variety of
school desegregation remedies, however, suggest an entirely
different matter. Some students attending desegregated school
systems get extensive compensatory education programs, others
get long bus rides, while groups of students may have choices in
what school they attend.3 70 At the local level, in the way individual
students are treated, school desegregation means very different
366. See generally Parker, supra note 189, at 485-501 (analyzing the very different
remedial decrees of Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas).
367. See supra notes 316-19 and accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 2d 944, 945, 947-50 (C.D. InI. 2002)
(Champaign Unit School District #4); Brinkman v. Gilligan, 85 F. Supp. 2d 761, 784 (S.D.
Ohio 1999) (Dayton Board of Education); Jenkins v. Sch. Dist., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1059
(W.D. Mo. 1999) (Kansas City, Missouri), rev'd, 216 F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2000).
369. See, e.g., Mills v. Freeman, 942 F. Supp. 1449, 1452 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (DeKalb County
School System); Arthur v. Nyquist, 904 F. Supp. 112,118-19 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (Buffalo School
System); Stanley v. Darlington County Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 1341, 1419 (D.S.C. 1995),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 84 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 1996); Stell v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 860 F.
Supp. 1563, 1582-83 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (Savannah-Chatham County Schools).
370. See supra Part II.
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things to different students. Granting defendants significant con-
trol over the desegregation process ensures a variety of remedial
approaches.
In Grutter, Justice O'Connor wrote approvingly of local experi-
mentation on admissions programs designed to increase minority
enrollment in different ways.37' She even quoted one of the Court's
more recent federalism opinions, United States v. Lopez, on the
benefit of allowing experimentation.372
The troubling part of allowing experimentation is evidenced by
the aftermath of Brown H1.373 School officials then were able to
define the school desegregation right so narrowly-with almost no
true enforcement of even that narrow definition of the right-that
plaintiffs were denied the promise of their constitutional rights.
With federalism impacting Equal Protection rights, schools have an
opportunity to weaken constitutional rights.
3. A Better Way?
That federalism may come and go as a value in affirmative
action jurisprudence, as it has in school desegregation, and that it
may result in different rights to different students, indicates a
major weakness in Grutter's idea of affording educators deference
when judging their race-conscious activity. A constancy in rights is
371. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority:
Universities in California, Florida, and Washington State, where racial
preferences in admissions are prohibited by state law, are currently engaged in
experimenting with a wide variety of alternative approaches. Universities in
other States can and should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-
neutral alternatives as they develop.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346 (2003).
372. See id. ("'The States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to
devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.') (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Justice
Kennedy countered in his dissenting opinion in Grutter: "By deferring to the law schools'
choice of minority admissions programs, the courts will lose the talents and resources of the
faculties and administrators in devising new and fairer ways to ensure individual
consideration.' Id. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("If
universities are given the latitude to administer programs that are tantamount to quotas,
they will have few incentives to make the existing minority admissions schemes transparent
and protective of individual review.").
373. See supra Part II.A.
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paramount to the Equal Protection Clause, and the role of federal-
ism indicates a lack of predictability in Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence.
Left open is the question of whether affording no deference is a
better approach. School desegregation again is a useful reference
point. American jurisprudence indicates that strong judicial
involvement in educational affairs is rarely a good thing and the
benefits of judicial involvement depend on the characteristics of
the individual judge and the impacted commun ty.3 74 Too many
commentators have already recounted the judiciary's lack of
competency in overseeing school desegregation for anyone readily
to accept the idea of strong judicial oversight in affirmative
action.175 In other words, school desegregation strongly counsels
allowing education officials some degree of deference when analyz-
ing their affirmative action policies. Judges simply lack the
institutional tools and knowledge to involve themselves closely in
educational policy or to effectuate meaningful policy change.376
Also left open is the question of whether affirmative action
litigation runs the risk of involving the judiciary in matters outside
its competency, such as educational theory. Affirmative action is
defended on the idea of diversity, which addresses educational
policy: How do students best learn inside and outside the class-
rooM? 77 Diversity can be a subterfuge for considering race for
reasons completely unrelated to education, such as societal
discrimination or discrimination by non-defendant actors.3 7 8 If that
374. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39, 130.
375. For a summary of the debate over the competency of federal judges in overseeing
cases requiring changes in institutional policy, see Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of
Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1406-08 (1991). Justice Thomas has made a similar
point. See supra note 360.
376. See supra Part V.A.
377. See supra Part I.
378. Professor Sanford Levinson has declared that Justice Powell's analysis has led to a
game of "Simon Says": "[Ihf Simon says, 'Start talking about diversity-and downplay any
talk about rectification of past social injustice,' then the conversation proceeds exactly in that
direction." Levinson, supra note 274, at 578. This game of Simon Says, however, did not
begin with Justice Powell. He got the idea from educators who filed an amicus brief
describing their programs as being based on diversity. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-17 (1978) (Powell, J.); see also 99 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1977
TERM SUPPLEMENT, pt. 2, at 695-738 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1978)
1766 [Vol. 45:1691
CONNECTING THE DOTS
is true, then the judiciary would be within its institutional compe-
tency to determine that intent (although Grutter indicates this may
be a futile inquiry). Otherwise, judges should be hesitant to second-
guess educators on their educational policy.
This should not mean, however, a wholesale deference to
defendants. In fact, the Court evinced a willingness to second-guess
the judgment of educators in the University of Michigan undergrad-
uate case, Gratz v. Bollinger.379 Thus, deference is not a blank
check; nor should it be. The Supreme Court has not excused itself
entirely from judicial oversight, only showing a proper hesitation in
delving too deeply into how students learn best, a matter best left
for educators.
CONCLUSION
The idea of courts affording education officials some degree of
deference when judging their race-conscious activity is not nearly
as novel as labeled by the dissenting Justices in Grutter. In fact,
these same Justices have actively supported a very similar value
in the context of school desegregation-local control. Thus, the
Justices stretched the truth a bit in describing deference as a new
approach.
On the question of whether the idea of deference is a good one,
school desegregation provides good reasons to be hesitant. Affording
defendants a role in constitutional analysis runs the serious risk
that the defendants' authority will be afforded deference only
when it supports the Court's desired outcome and that rights will
vary significantly by geography, with the possibility of school
officials skirting the judiciary's true principles. Yet, this Article
ultimately comes to support Grutter's notion of deference. The
judiciary certainly has limited expertise in educational policy and
limited success in affecting social change. Therefore, defendants
(reprinting the amicus brief of Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford
University and the University of Pennsylvania, which discussed at length the importance of
diversity). Thus, educators have claimed diversity before knowing that the Supreme Court
would find the reason acceptable. Granted, the justification of diversity may not justify the
actual practices of schools, but it is an idea at least originating in schools themselves, not the
courts.
379. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
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must have some authority as a practical matter, but the judiciary
should be watchful in making sure that the authority stays within
minimally prescribed constitutional limits.
